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FORECLOSURE IN THE HEARTLAND: WHAT
DID WE LEARN?
Abigail Lawlis Kuzma∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Indiana is still reeling from the foreclosure crisis. In January 2015,
Indiana was listed within the top ten highest foreclosure states in the
nation.1 Earlier, in December 2014, one in every 1033 housing units
received a foreclosure filing, while nationally, the rate was one in every
1153 housing units.2 Further, the Indianapolis homeownership rate has
fallen 13.5%—second only to Las Vegas in homeownership decline.3
This is a particularly significant decline because eight years ago,
Indianapolis boasted the highest homeownership rate in the nation.4
This Article examines the causes and impact of the foreclosure crisis
in Indiana and the Midwest. It also identifies the federal and state
responses to the crisis and analyzes their effectiveness. The Attorney
General Mortgage Multistate, combined with state efforts such as
mediation and settlement conference legislative reforms, housing
counseling networks, foreclosure hotlines, the Indiana Supreme Court
Foreclosure Task Force, and court facilitator programs, have assisted
homeowners to avoid foreclosure or at least minimize its financial
devastation.
II. CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
The decade-long housing bubble that burst in late 2007 initiated a
foreclosure crisis across America. The crisis was felt across the country,
but was particularly acute in Midwestern states such as Indiana. The
causes of the crisis, which are still debated today, are discussed below.
Before examining the possible causes of the crisis, one must comprehend
the enormity of the foreclosure crisis in the Midwest, particularly in
Indiana. This Article introduces the impact of the foreclosure crisis on
∗

Assistant Attorney General and Chief Counsel for the Division of Victim Services and
Outreach, Indiana Attorney General’s Office. The author thanks Jonathan Sichtermann,
Lisa Wolf, Joshua Timmons, and Joshua Newton for their assistance with this Article.
1
U.S. Foreclosures, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/mapsearch/us.html (last
visited Jan. 16, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/2Q8V-JA8J.
2
Stacy Jones, Top Foreclosure States December: Indiana, BANKRATE (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/real-estate/state-foreclosures-indiana/, archived at
http://perma.cc/L8EH-4F65.
3
See Jeff Swiatek, Home, Not So Sweet Home, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 25, 2012, at A1,
available at 2012 WLNR 13210576 (referring to Census Bureau data compiled since 2006).
4
Id.
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the Midwest, followed by general causes of the financial crisis, and will
specifically delve into the impact of mortgage fraud schemes in Indiana.
A. Impact of the Foreclosure Crisis on the Midwest
The Midwest was devastated by foreclosures when the 1997–2007
housing bubble burst, resulting in the 2008 financial crisis.5 When
RealtyTrac released its October 2007 U.S. Foreclosure Market Report,
Indiana ranked among the top ten states with the most foreclosures,
along with Michigan, Ohio, and Illinois.6 The worst-hit states fell into
two categories: states where speculators walked away from investment
properties or states where a miserable economy exacerbated the effect of
the housing crisis.7 The Midwestern states, including Indiana, fall into
the second category.8
In 2008, Michigan, Illinois, and Ohio remained in the top ten states
with the most foreclosures alongside states with significant investment
housing, such as Nevada, Arizona, Florida, California, and Colorado.9
See
Melinda
Fulmer,
State
Ranked
By
Foreclosure
Rates,
MSN,
http://realestate.msn.com/article.aspx?cp-documentid=13107814 (last visited Aug. 22,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/HR72-NJYD (listing the markets most affected by
foreclosure filings); Peter J. Wallison, The True Story of the Financial Crisis, 44 AM.
SPECTATOR 12, 14 (May 2011) (discussing the financial crisis and subsequent housing
bubble deflation and attributing the latter to the government’s housing policy). See
generally U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 2 Percent in October 2007, REALTYTRAC (Dec. 6,
2007),
http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/us-foreclosure-activityincreases-2-percent-in-october-2007-3465,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/9LJG-56FH
(providing foreclosure statistics and ranking states based on those statistics).
6
Id.; see also Fulmer, supra note 5 (ranking the states by 2007 foreclosure rates).
7
See U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 2 Percent in October 2007, supra note 5 (suggesting
that states such as Florida, Nevada, and California are examples of states where speculators
walked away because the states posted the top foreclosure rates).
8
See Dina ElBoghdady, Housing Crisis Knocks Loudly in Michigan: Foreclosures Hit Record
Numbers as Region Continues to Lose Jobs, WASH. POST (Mar. 31, 2007), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/30/AR20070330021
27_pf.html, archived at http://perma.cc/N2ZG-44YC [hereinafter ElBoghdady, Housing
Crisis Knocks] (stating that the Midwest mortgage crisis was “exacerbated by fundamental
problems with [that region’s] economy”).
9
See generally id. (suggesting that in the industrial Midwest there are “a record number
of people missing their mortgage payments and [thus] losing their homes”); Steve
McLinden, Top 10 States for Foreclosure, BANKRATE.COM (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/real-estate/top-10-states-for-foreclosure-1.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/AT69-8AY9, http://perma.cc/KCA6-2RCM (noting the
housing boom’s effect on investment in Nevada, Florida, California, Arizona, and
Michigan); Luke Mullins, The Top 10 Foreclosure States (as of August), U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT (Sept. 24, 2008, 4:07 PM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-homefront/2008/09/24/the-top-10-foreclosure-states-as-of-august, archived at http://perma.cc/
7U85-U9QN (listing the top ten foreclosure states as of August 2008, including Nevada,
California, Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Illinois, and Indiana). See also Aldo Svaldi,
5
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Detroit had the tenth highest metropolitan foreclosure rate in the nation,
“[w]ith 4.52% of its housing units (one in [twenty-two]) receiving a
foreclosure filing” in 2008.10
Unemployment exacerbated foreclosure woes in the Midwest.11
Indiana’s unemployment rate remained above 8% for over four and a
For sixteen
half years, from December 2008 to August 2013.12
consecutive months in 2009 and 2010, the rate swelled above 10%.13
Other Midwest states, such as Ohio and Wisconsin, suffered similar
fates.14 In Illinois, the unemployment rate started rising sharply in 2008,
hovered over 11% for six months in 2009 and 2010, and remains above
8% according to the latest data.15 Michigan’s unemployment rate peaked
at 14.2% in mid-2009, and also remains above 8%.16
B. Causes of the Financial Crisis
Before we can determine the effectiveness of responses to the
foreclosure crisis, it is critical to understand the causes, and thereby have
the ability to determine, whether these responses have truly addressed
the core problems. Many authors have analyzed the housing and
financial crisis which resulted in the ongoing foreclosure debacle. Barry
Colorado Bank Failures Exceed Expectations When Measured by Assets, DENV. POST (Aug. 28,
2011), http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_18773942, archived at http://perma.cc/
PH4X-4CNS (questioning the housing bubble’s effect on Colorado, but recognizing that a
couple of key Colorado counties had “robust development” during the housing bubble).
10
Foreclosure
Activity
Up
81%
in
’08,
BUS.
J.
(Jan.
6,
2009),
http://businessjournaldaily.com/foreclosure-activity-81-08-2009-1-6,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/Q6HM-NP7G.
11
See Renae Merle, Rising Unemployment Levels Help Push Record Numbers of Homeowners
into Delinquency or Foreclosure, WASH. POST (May 29, 2009), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/28/AR20090528017
12.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LM3D-ST5Y (reviewing the effect of rising
unemployment levels on foreclosure rates across the U.S.).
12
U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Local Area Unemployment Statistics
(Indiana) (Apr. 5, 2014), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST180000000000003, archived at
http://perma.cc/T4UY-64VS.
13
Id.
14
U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Local Area Unemployment Statistics
(Ohio) (Apr. 5, 2014), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST390000000000003, archived at
http://perma.cc/NXA7-9PZA; U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area
Unemployment Statistics (Wisconsin) (Apr. 5, 2014), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/
LASST550000000000003, archived at http://perma.cc/7UUR-7HNE.
15
U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Local Area Unemployment Statistics
(Illinois) (Apr. 5, 2014), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST170000000000003, archived at
http://perma.cc/6J54-79SV.
16
U.S. DEP’T. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Local Area Unemployment Statistics
(Michigan) (Apr. 5, 2014), http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LASST260000000000003, archived
at http://perma.cc/7T9R-FQSY.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 9

42

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Ritholtz and Aaron Task list seven factors that led to the crisis, including
the lack of regulatory oversight over instruments such as credit-default
swaps and collateralized-debt obligations.17 They also list other causes,
such as the Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations’
inaccurate ratings, a payment structure in which investment banks pay
their regulators, and investment banks’ increased leverage.18 Another
author lists the banks’ ability to forum shop from an “alphabet soup” of
bank regulators—the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, and the Comptroller of the Currency.19
Julia Patterson Forrester attributes the rise in subprime loans to the
originate-to-distribute model of mortgage financing, which reduced the
risk to mortgage originators and facilitated the proliferation of higherrisk mortgages and the fragmentation of the mortgage originator
market.20 She also cites the federal government’s preemption of state
usury ceilings and consumer credit protection laws that restricted
alternative mortgage financing as contributing factors.21

Barry Ritholtz, 7 Factors That Led to Crisis, THE BIG PICTURE (June 4, 2009, 11:48 AM),
http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/06/7-factors-that-led-to-crisis/,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/HYW4-LHDF; see also Stephen J. Dubner, How Would You Simplify the
Financial-Reform Bill? A Freakonomics Quorum, FREAKONOMICS (Aug. 19, 2010, 11:00 AM),
http://www.freakonomics.com/2010/08/19/how-would-you-simplify-the-financialreform-bill-a-freakonomics-quorum/, archived at http://perma.cc/S6W-RHD4 (discussing
the Bailout Nation authors’ ideas on what could have been done to prevent the financial
crisis). “The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA) exempted derivatives
such as Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) from all
regulatory oversight. There were no reserve requirements, capital minimums, [and no]
exchange listings[.]” Id. (emphasis removed).
18
See BARRY RITHOLTZ & AARON TASK, BAILOUT NATION: HOW GREED AND EASY MONEY
CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND SHOOK THE WORLD ECONOMY 132, 143–44, 157–58 (John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2009) (discussing the ratings agencies’ power, and using Enron as an
example of the rating agencies’ incompetency); Dubner, supra note 17 (suggesting Ritholtz
and Task’s criticism of ratings agencies indicated that rating agencies were essentially
giving triple-A ratings to “junk” in return for payment from investment banks). “Prior to
2004, Wall Street firms were limited to 12-to-1 leverage by the 1975 net capitalization rule.
In 2004, the five largest banks received a waiver, allowing their leverage to go up to 25, 30,
even 40, to 1.” Id.
19
Adam Davidson & Melissa Block, U.S. Eyes Single Bank Regulator, NPR (May 28, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104679069,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/R9W9-ZTHH.
20
Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the
Federal Government’s Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 381–83, 390–91,
396 (1994).
21
See id. at 398–401 (discussing Congress’ preemption of state law in an attempt to
benefit the home mortgage market).
17

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss1/9

Lawlis Kuzma: Foreclosure in the Heartland: What Did We Learn?

2014]

Foreclosure in the Heartland

43

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission issued its report in January
2011.22 The Commission’s purpose was to explain the financial crisis’
cause, and all the members agreed that “the crisis was caused largely by
the losses to financial institutions arising from the high rates of
[mortgage] delinquency and failure among subprime and other lowquality mortgages in the 1997–2007 housing bubble.”23 The Commission
majority concluded “there was untrammeled growth in risky mortgages”
and “[u]nsustainable, toxic loans polluted the financial system and
fueled the housing bubble.”24 The report condemned abusive broker
practices such as yield-spread premiums and toxic mortgage products.25
Peter Wallison, a member of the commission minority, credited “the
wholesale failure of bank and financial-institution managements,” and
recognized the twenty-seven million subprime and other risky loans that
existed in the U.S. financial system leading up to the financial crisis:
“never in the past were half of all mortgages in the United States in

22

FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE

UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4U6G-JMCC [hereinafter referred to as FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT].
23
PETER J. WALLISON, AM. ENTER. INST. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, THE LOST CAUSE:
THE FAILURE OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, FIN. SERV. OUTLOOK 1, 1 (Jan.–
Feb. 2011), available at http://www.aei.org/files/2011/02/10/FSO-2011-02-g.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/4LZ-KEDQ [hereinafter WALLISON, LOST CAUSE]. Wallison was a
member of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and wrote a dissent in the
Commission’s Final Report. Id.; see FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 22, at 452
(Wallison, dissenting) (arguing that U.S. housing policies—not “deregulation or lack of
regulation, . . . predatory lending” or other factors cited in the report of the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission’s majority—were the major factors contributing to the 2008 financial
crisis).
24
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 22, at 101.
25
See Tom Petruno, Mozilo Knew Hazardous Waste When He Saw It, L.A. TIMES (June 4,
2009, 5:12 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/money_co/2009/06/the-use-of-toxic-todescribe-high-risk-mortgages-has-been-de-rigueur-for-the-last-two-years-now-it-lookslike-countrywide.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QF8C-3A2K (stating that the term
“toxic” is generally applied to loans that are disadvantageous to the borrower). For
example, in State v. Countrywide Financial Corporation, Countrywide agreed to compensate
homeowners who received Pay Option adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”), defined as
ARMs that, during an initial period (and subject to Recast) permit the borrower to choose
among two or more payment options, including an interest-only payment and a minimum
(or limited payment)—which may result in negative amortization—and Subprime
Mortgage Loans defined as first-lien residential mortgage loans that combine higher risk
features (such as low or no documentation, low equity, adjustable interest rates,
prepayment penalties, cash-out financing) with higher risk borrower profiles (lower FICO
scores, recent bankruptcies/foreclosures, major derogatory credit) resulting in a loan that
could not reasonably be underwritten and approved as a “prime” loan. State Farm v.
Countrywide Financial Corp., No. 76C01-0808-PL-0652, slip op. at 9 (Ind. Cir. Ct. 2008).
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danger of delinquency and default when a housing bubble deflated.”26
Given these facts as a backdrop, Wallison focused on other factors,
including the deterioration of underwriting standards, which were
influenced by government programs beginning in the early 1990s when
Congress “imposed . . . affordable housing requirements on Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.”27 Further, the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”) “tightened and extended these
requirements so that by 2007, [55%] of all loans had to qualify as
affordable-housing loans to [low- and moderate-income (LMI)]
borrowers.”28 This practice put Fannie and Freddie into competition for
these loans with other banks who are required to make similar loans
under the Community Reinvestment Act, causing the decline of
underwriting standards.29
C. The Impact of Mortgage Fraud Schemes in Indiana
Besides the relaxed origination standards, proliferation of abusive
sub-prime lending products, and a lack of regulatory oversight,
mortgage fraud also contributed to the Midwest housing crisis.30
Unfortunately, Indiana had its share of mortgage fraud cases that
ultimately led to homeowner default and foreclosure, and the criminal
conviction of the perpetrator(s).31
PETER J. WALLISON, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, STATEMENT BEFORE THE
HOUSING FINANCIAL SERVICES COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION,
16 (Feb. 16, 2011) [hereinafter WALLISON, STATEMENT]; WALLISON, LOST CAUSE, supra note
23, at 3.
27
WALLISON, LOST CAUSE, supra note 23, at 3–4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
28
Id at 4. LMI borrowers are “home buyers whose income was at or below the median
income in the areas where they lived.” Id.
29
Id. Countrywide and other lenders were similarly operating under another HUD
program, and “[w]ith all these agencies and firms seeking the same loans from the same
group of potential borrowers, it was inevitable that underwriting standards would
decline.” Id. at 1.
30
See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 22, at 447 (discussing the role of
predatory borrowers, who engaged in mortgage fraud, as another contributing factor to the
financial crisis); see also Dennis Norman, Mortgage Fraud Continues to Climb—Midwest Leads
LOUIS
REAL
EST.
NEWS
(Apr.
27,
2010),
the
Way,
ST.
http://stlouisrealestatenews.com/financing/mortgage-fraud-continues-to-climb-midwestleads-the-way/, archived at http://perma.cc/U38K-F4ZK (discussing reported incidents of
mortgage fraud in 2008 and 2009 and stating that Midwestern states have some of the
highest concentrations of fraud).
31
See Indictment at A6, United States v. Ross, No. 1:08-cr-0018-LJM-KPF (S.D. Ind. Jan.
30, 2008) [hereinafter Ross Indictment] (describing that in 2008, Ross and Locke were
indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and thirty-six counts of wire
fraud and aiding and abetting). Ross was also indicted for bankruptcy fraud based on
allegations that she filed bankruptcy petitions in family members’ names without their
consent.
Press Release, Living the High Life, FBI (May 17, 2011),
26
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The Beverly Ross and Donella Locke multi-million dollar mortgagefraud scheme is a classic example of the type of mortgage fraud
committed from 2004 through 2008.32 Ross and Locke recruited buyers
to purchase residential properties, who agreed to buy the identified
property “in exchange for a sum of money” at closing.33 Often, a buyer
was led to believe he or she was temporarily lending his or her credit
information to assist someone with a lower credit score to buy a
property.34
Ross and Locke worked with “mortgage brokers, title companies,
and appraisers to accomplish the sale of these properties to the recruited
buyers [and] borrowers” and then received funds they were not entitled
to receive from the closings.35 The investigation revealed that Ross and
Locke falsified a variety of information on documents to defraud lenders,
including income amounts, rent verifications, employment verifications,
social security numbers, and business names.36
“Throughout the [mortgage-fraud] scheme Donella Locke was a
licensed real estate broker who operated Locke and Key Real Estate.”37
The Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) brought charges before the
http://www.fbi.gov/indianapolis/about-us/history-1/living-the-high-life, archived at
http://perma.cc/T5X9-75T3.
32
See United States v. Locke, 643 F.3d 235, 236–37 (7th Cir. 2011) (describing the
defendant’s actions and circumstances surrounding the mortgage fraud); Living the High
Life, supra note 31 (reporting that Ross and Locke were part of a mortgage fraud scheme
involving over $23 million).
33
Ross Indictment, supra note 31, at A2. The homes ranged in price from $300,000 to
$1.4 million, and the aggregate loan value on these thirty-six properties was $23.5 million.
Id. at A7–A10.
34
Id. at A2–A3; Press Release, FBI, Second Defendant Sentenced in Mortgage Fraud
Scheme (Feb. 12, 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/indianapolis/press-releases/2010/
ip021210a.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/F5N6-DXED.
35
Ross Indictment, supra note 31, at A2. This mortgage fraud scheme also involved
three other individuals: an appraiser, a loan broker, and a settlement agent. Id. The article
also describes two transactions in which Locke and Ross received illicit funds, including
$28,980 in one and $204,500 in another. Id. at A5–A6. See Gabrielle J. Owens & Laura A.
Turner, Regulatory Roundup from the Office of the Indiana Attorney General: Case Closed, IND.
REALTOR ADVOC. (Aug. 2010), available at http://indianarealtors.com/Uploads/
Indiana_Realtor_Advocate/Attorney_General_8_20_10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
SJB5-PTNF (describing the investigation and the resulting charges filed against the other
individuals involved).
36
See Second Defendant Sentenced in Mortgage Fraud Scheme, supra note 34 (noting
that these false statements induced lenders to make loans they otherwise would not have
made); Gabrielle J. Owens, Regulatory Roundup from the Office of the Indiana Attorney General:
REALTOR
ADVOC.
(Mar.
2010),
available
at
Case
Closed,
IND.
http://www.indianarealtors.com/uploads/indiana_realtor_advocate/Attorney_general_3
_19_10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/FGK6-R3HA (explaining the false and misleading
documents used to mislead lenders).
37
Owens, supra note 36.
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Indiana Professional Licensing Board in an administrative proceeding
against Locke, and the Indiana Real Estate Commission summarily
The
suspended her real estate broker’s license in April 2008.38
commission found that Locke would “represent[] a clear and immediate
danger to the public if she were allowed to continue to practice as a
principal broker in the State of Indiana.”39 On September 18, 2009, a
federal jury convicted Locke on five counts of wire fraud, and she was
sentenced to prison for five years and eleven months and ordered to pay
$2.3 million in restitution to thirteen lenders.40
Mortgage defrauders also target people in financial trouble who are
facing foreclosure. For example, in State v. Shrader, the Respondent,
Shrader, preyed on financially distressed homeowners who needed to
sell their homes quickly.41 Shrader promised the homeowner that he
could resolve their financial problems by “creat[ing] a trust, nam[ing]
Shrader as the trustee, and then [have the homeowner] assign all
beneficial interest in the trust to Shrader.”42 Instead of purchasing the
home outright, Shrader convinced the homeowner that he would pay the
mortgage with funds collected through leasing (or providing a lease with
an option to purchase) to persons who needed to improve their credit.43
In fact, Shrader did not make the mortgage payments but instead
collected and pocketed the rent.44 Through this scheme, Shrader violated
the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, the Home Loan Practices
Act, and Indiana licensing law.45
Shrader also committed mortgage fraud using short sales as his
vehicle.46 In a scheme that has been coined “flopping,” the perpetrator
buys real estate via the short sale process and then sells the real estate to
a buyer who is willing to pay an amount higher than the short sale

Id.
Id.
40
Id. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Locke’s conviction, but reversed the
sentencing and restitution order. United States v. Locke, 643 F.3d at 235, 248 (7th Cir.
2011). The court held that the trial court improperly considered conduct underlying
charges against Locke that had been dismissed and ordered restitution without making
sufficient findings of fact to support the order. Id. at 245, 248.
41
Complaint at 5–23, State v. Shrader, No. 29D01-1005-PL-570 (Sup. Ct. Hamilton Co.
2010); Owens & Turner, supra note 35.
42
Owens & Turner, supra note 35.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See id. (explaining that the court enjoined Shrader “from committing deceptive acts in
connection with real estate transactions” but noting that the matter was still pending at the
time the piece was written).
38
39
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price.47
In these transactions, Shrader approached distressed
homeowners facing foreclosure and offered to negotiate a short sale with
the lender.48 Meanwhile, he listed the property with a realtor at the same
time that he entered into a purchase agreement with the homeowner.49
Under this scheme, he “closed on the [short sale] [only] if he was able to
locate a buyer who would pay more than the negotiated price of the
short sale.”50 Then, after conducting back-to-back closings, he pocketed
the difference between the short sale price and the true market sale price,
defrauding both the lender and the homeowner.51 In this case, the court
found that Shrader violated the Indiana Mortgage Rescue Protection
Fraud Act by taking power of attorney from the homeowner for
improper purposes, and also for “taking an equitable interest in the
property to secure payment of his services.”52
Many people who engage in flopping set up a limited liability
company (“LLC”) to act as the straw buyer.53 The floppers also hide
from the original seller the fact that there is a legitimate potential buyer
for the property at the time of the floppers’ offer.54 Perpetrators may
even advise property owners to stop paying an otherwise current
mortgage to make the property eligible for a short sale.55 Floppers harm
everyone involved in the transaction: the property owner ends up
potentially liable for the difference between the mortgage balance and
the short sale price, the legitimate buyer pays an inflated price, and the
lender takes a loss on a mortgage on a property for which there was a
willing buyer.56
47
See Dina Elboghdady, Inspector General Says Changes to Making Home Affordable May
Impede Help, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/04/20/AR2010042005182.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
DF2F-P2DH (noting that short sales involving struggling borrowers are vulnerable to
flopping schemes).
48
Owens & Turner, supra note 35.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Nick Carey, Special Report: Flipping, Flopping and Booming Mortgage Fraud, REUTERS
(Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/17/us-housing-usa-fraudidUSTRE67G1S620100817, archived at http://perma.cc/5L7P-A35C.
54
See Lew Sichelman, Short-Sale 'Flopping' May Be Next Big Housing Scam, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 5, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/05/business/la-fi-lew-20100905,
archived at http://perma.cc/77U6-MEN7 (alerting homeowners to be wary if advised that
the lender agrees to a price well below the home’s market value).
55
Mortgage Scams: Protect Yourself from Mortgage Fraud, MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE.ORG
(2011), http://web.archive.org/web/20111207231947/http://www.mortgage-foreclosure.
org/mortgage-scam.html, archived at http://perma.cc/L6V2-JL56.
56
Catherine Reagor, Phoenix Real Estate Strategy of ‘Flopping’ Examined, AZCENTRAL.COM
(Nov. 14, 2010), http://www.azcentral.com/business/realestate/articles/2010/11/14/
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Since the foreclosure crisis hit Indiana, another common fraud is the
mortgage-consultant scam.57 The OAG has sued almost 100 mortgageconsultant companies involved in this scam.58 In a recent case filed
against Foreclosure Assistance USA, Inc., the OAG’s complaint alleged
that the mortgage-consultant company took up-front money from
Indiana consumers without having a surety bond and made
misrepresentations to Indiana consumers.59 The lawsuit identified
nearly 600 consumers across Indiana who had contracts with Foreclosure
Assistance USA.60 In the years since the foreclosure crisis hit Indiana,
however, both federal and state governments have taken actions to
lessen the impact of the crisis.
III. FEDERAL EFFORTS TO MITIGATE THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS
The federal government took several steps to mitigate the
foreclosure crisis. Though none have been perfect, the programs,
described below, responded to specific concerns raised by the
foreclosure crisis. First, Part III.A discusses the Home Affordable
Modification Program (“HAMP”).61 Next, Part III.B introduces the
20101114phoenix-real-estate-short-sale-flopping.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TVM4NYM2.
57
See Mark Huffman, Indiana Stepping Up Anti-Foreclosure Efforts, CONSUMER AFFAIRS
(Oct. 11, 2011), http://web.archive.org/web/20120503133748/http://www.consumer
affairs.com/news04/2011/10/indiana-stepping-up-anti-foreclosure-efforts.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/YN5U-NFBT (discussing the Indiana Attorney General’s efforts to
combat scams by mortgage modification consultants).
58
See Press Release, Office of the Ind. Att’y Gen., Attorney General’s Office Sues Four
Foreclosure
Rescue
Companies
(Feb.
8,
2012),
http://www.in.gov/
activecalendar/EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=51948&information_id=1041
51&type=&syndicate=syndicate, archived at http://perma.cc/GV7L-ZHSB (noting that as
of February 2012, the number of lawsuits initiated against the mortgage rescue companies
had risen to ninety-five); see also Press Release, Office of the Ind. Att’y Gen., Attorney
General Targets Illegal Florida-Based Foreclosure Company (Aug. 10, 2011),
http://www.in.gov/portal/news_events/72230.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/TQP57WEP (noting that the OAG had opened over five hundred investigations on foreclosure
consultants since 2009).
59
Complaint for Injunction, Restitution, Costs, and Civil Penalties at 4–5, 10, State v.
Foreclosure Assistance USA, Inc., No. 2C01-1005-PL-50 (Cir. Ct. Allen Co. May 27, 2010)
[hereinafter Foreclosure Assistance USA Complaint]. The case was dismissed after
Foreclosure Assistance USA agreed to an Assurance of Voluntary Compliance and $20,000
in consumer restitution. Moe Bedard, FA USA: Indiana AG Goes after Ohio Loan Modification
Firm with the Long Arm of the Law, LOANSAFE.ORG (May 27, 2010),
http://www.loansafe.org/fa-usa-loan-modification, archived at http://perma.cc/YQU832TT.
60
Foreclosure Assistance USA Complaint, supra note 59. On March 4, 2009, AVC signed
the complaint, which included a claim for $20,000 in consumer restitution. Id.
61
See infra Part III.A (providing an overview of HAMP).
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amendments made to Regulation Z.62 Finally, Part III.C ends with a
discussion of the Dodd-Frank Act.63
A. The HAMP Program
The U.S. Treasury Department announced the details of HAMP on
March 4, 2009.64 HAMP, a loan modification program, is part of the
Making Home Affordable Program, and its purpose is “to reduce
delinquent and at-risk borrowers’ monthly mortgage payments.”65
Mortgages with an origination date before January 1, 2009 are eligible for
HAMP and the program will remain in effect until December 31, 2015.66
Individual mortgage companies had long set up loss-mitigation
departments within their companies to contact homeowners who were in
default and assist those homeowners in catching up or modifying their
mortgage contracts so they could continue to pay their mortgages and
stay in their home.67 In fact, long before HAMP was implemented, lossmitigation requirements existed that provided loan products guaranteed
by the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) or the Veterans
Administration.68 These loss-mitigation alternatives included assisting
the homeowner with entering into a repayment agreement with the

See infra Part III.B (introducing the amendments that were made to Regulation Z).
See infra Part III.C (analyzing the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act).
64
Home
Affordable
Modification
Program,
FREDDIE
MAC
(2014),
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/service/mha_modification.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/92HH-9YSA.
65
Id.; see W. Justin Jacobs, Note, Help or Hamp(er)? The Courts’ Reluctance to Provide the
Right to a Private Action Under HAMP, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 267, 273 (2012) (discussing the
implementation of HAMP).
66
Jacobs, supra note 65; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Obama Administration
Extends Application Deadline for the Making Home Affordable Program (May 30, 2013),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl1959.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/U8RQ-VMHF.
67
See Harriet Newburger, Servicers Key to Limiting Loan Losses, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA.
(2007), http://www.philadelphiafed.org/community-development/publications/cascade
/66/01_limiting-loan-losses.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc/QW6M-P3N6 (discussing
servicers’ increase in loss mitigation activity, including the addition of units to their loss
mitigation departments, as the number of delinquent loans increased).
68
See, e.g., Loss Mitigation Policy & Guidance, U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://
portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/sfh/nsc/lmmltrs
(last
visited Apr. 4, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/57T6-YTJZ (providing a list of loss
mitigation documents, some of which pre-date HAMP); VETERANS BENEFITS ADMIN.,
CIRCULAR 26-10-6, REVISED VA MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM 1 (2010), available at
http://www.benefits.va.gov/HOMELOANS/circulars/26_10_6.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/RHT4-5YDH (indicating a history of loss-mitigation options before
HAMP).
62
63
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mortgage company.69 The homeowner might also be offered a loan
modification, under which the lender would extend the loan term of the
loan or reduce the loan’s interest rate so the homeowner could afford the
monthly payments.70 FHA loss-mitigation also included a partial claim
where funds would be advanced for a mortgagor to reinstate the
delinquent loan, but that amount was not to exceed twelve months’
worth of principal, interest, taxes, and insurance.71 Finally, upon
determining that the homeowner is not eligible for an alternative
allowing the homeowner to remain in the home, the mortgagee may
offer the homeowner a short sale or a deed in lieu of foreclosure.72
Under these options, the homeowner must leave the home, but the
arrearage that the homeowner would normally owe upon a judgment for
foreclosure is waived.73 The homeowner is eligible for these lossmitigation options only if he or she demonstrates a hardship.74
Mortgage companies outside of the HUD program could offer a lossmitigation option to homeowners with non-FHA loans.75 However,
69
Letter from John C. Weicher, Asst. Sec’y Hous.-Fed. Hous. Comm’r, to All Approved
Mortgagees, Mortgagee Letter 2002-17, at 1–2 (Aug. 29, 2002), available at
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=DOC_16808.doc (noting that
under the repayment agreement, the homeowner paid the regular mortgage payment
along with an additional amount per month for a stated period of time until the
homeowner repaid the arrearage).
70
Letter from William C. Apgar, Asst. Sec’y Hous.-Fed. Hous. Comm’r, to All Approved
Mortgagees., Mortgagee Letter 00-05, at 18 (Jan. 19, 2000), available at
http://api.ning.com/files/Y7XrEGzfaFcG-bsyrZIzSrXcKUJYI2SwJqF27S4YHYQ5LvHdc6f
DCcAFirVLPganSTQdeZVTzDW03baM4EUSIS72XKlNywOt/MORTGAGEELETTER0005.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L2U3-2DYZ [hereafter Apgar Letter].
71
See Letter from John C. Weicher, Asst. Sec’y Hous.-Fed. Hous. Comm’r, to All
Approved Mortgagees, Mortgagee Letter 2003-19, at 1 (Nov. 20, 2003), available at
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Residential/2003/fha-03-19.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/2JF7-TRDF (stating that when the mortgagor accepted the partial claim
advance, he or she had to sign, “upon acceptance of the advance, . . . a promissory note and
subordinate mortgage payable to HUD”).
72
See Apgar Letter, supra note 70, at 29 (noting that under the short sale option, the
mortgagee agrees to a sale of the home to a third party, under certain conditions or
procedures, for a price below the arrearage owed). Under the deed in lieu of foreclosure
option, the mortgagee agrees by contract to accept the home. Id. at 35.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 30, 36. In other words, the homeowner must demonstrate that a hardship event
occurred that caused the homeowner to get behind on the mortgage payments, such as the
death of a spouse, the loss of a job, or an illness. See id. (listing some circumstances that
constitute a hardship).
75
See, e.g., Bulletin from Patricia J. McClung, Vice Pres. Offerings Mgt., to All Freddie
Mac
Servicers,
Bulletin
No.
2009-28
(Dec.
14,
2009),
available
at
http://www.freddiemac.com/singlefamily/guide/bulletins/pdf/bll0928.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/Z5G4-446G (announcing Freddie Mac’s changes to its own servicing
guidelines in light of recent changes to HAMP); Announcement from Gwen Muse-Evans,
Vice Pres. & Chief Risk Officer Credit Portfolio Mgmt., Fannie Mae, Updates to Fannie
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these communications place the homeowner in an unequal negotiating
position because he or she is not represented by a housing counselor,
and the mortgage company has the upper hand with respect to
information and power, which often results in unfavorable terms to the
homeowner and frequently ends in default.76
The HAMP program extends many of these loss-mitigation options
to homeowners with loans held by mortgagees who agreed to comply
with the HAMP program.77 HAMP, however, has not been as effective
as expected in reducing foreclosure rates, and the program continues to
receive criticism. For example, “[t]he biggest complaint is that servicers
take so long to review and approve short sales that potential buyers give
up or walk away . . . even after the agent has spent hundreds of hours
collecting paperwork and sending it to the servicer for approval.”78
Another complaint is that servicers ignore guidelines altogether.79
The June 2011 Treasury Report (“Report”) on the HAMP mortgage
modification program rated Bank of America the worst in three of four
categories, along with Wells Fargo and Chase.80 In fact, the Treasury
Department suspended payment to these banks until they improved
their compliance under the HAMP contracts.81 Further, the Report
Mae’s Mortgage Modification Requirements, Announcement SVC-2011-03 (Apr. 4, 2011),
available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2011/svc1103.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/JL5J-5YQW (explaining an update to Fannie Mae’s guidelines
requiring loan servicers to consider a range of loss mitigation options for defaulting
borrowers).
76
April Housing Scorecard Shows Growing Evidence of Economic Progress, RIS MEDIA (May
10,
2011),
http://rismedia.com/2011-05-09/april-housing-scorecard-shows-growingevidence-of-economic-progress/, archived at http://perma.cc/X82L-JH49 (explaining that
HAMP loan modification programs have proven more sustainable than traditional
industry loan modifications).
77
Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program:
Overview, FANNIE MAE,
https://www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/foreclosure_alternatives.jsp (last visited
Nov. 19, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/8X5A-WYL9.
78
See Kate Berry & Marc Hochstein, Shortchanged?, 176 AM. BANKER 6, 6 (Jan. 6, 2011)
(discussing complaints about HAFA).
79
Id.
80
Alan White, Too Big to Comply, CREDIT SLIPS (June 9, 2011, 10:40 AM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2011/06/too-big-to-comply.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/AY63-5AK6.
81
DEP’T OF TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT
THROUGH APRIL 2011, at 16 (June 9, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/Documents/April%202011%20MHA
%20Report%20FINAL.PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/DEJ6-BZ7R.
Treasury resumed
making HAMP incentive payments to Wells Fargo after one quarter, but continued to
withhold payments to Bank of America and Chase. DEP’T OF TREAS., MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH JULY 2011, at 18 (Sept. 1, 2011),
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHAReports/Documents/July%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.PDF,
archived
at
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provided confirmation of what many homeowners, housing counselors,
and lawyers had been experiencing: “temporary agreements that never
become permanent, servicers losing and misrecording borrower
information, and not communicating effectively with homeowners about
applications and decisions.”82
The program is not reaching enough homeowners. As noted by
Alan White in June 2011:
Only 30,000 HAMP modifications are being added each
month, while new foreclosure starts hover around the
150,000 to 200,000 per month level. The number of
temporary modifications in limbo past the [three month]
program limit before becoming permanent is way down,
except at the big three banks, which now account for
half of all temporary [modifications] passing their six
month mark.83
Through November 2013, approximately 1.3 million borrowers received
a permanent HAMP modification, less than 125,000 received a secondlien modification under the Second Lien Modification Program (“2MP”),
and less than 250,000 exited their homes through a short sale or deed in
lieu of foreclosure under the HAFA program.84 This falls well short of
the program’s goal of three to four million first lien modifications.85

http://perma.cc/B4EU-4CJQ. In its fourth quarter report, the Treasury noted that Bank of
America had substantially remediated identified compliance issues and Chase had made
progress in remediating compliance issues and withheld HAMP incentive payments would
be paid to these servicers. DEP’T OF TREAS., MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM
PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH JANUARY 2012, at 20 (Mar. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/results/MHA-Reports/
Documents/Jan%202012%20MHA%20Report_WITH_SERVICER_ASSESSMENTS_FINAL.
PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/8MVN-KCS7.
82
White, supra note 80.
83
Id.
84
DEP’T OF TREAS., MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT
THROUGH NOVEMBER 2013, at 1 (Jan. 10, 2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/November%202013%20MHA%20
Report%20Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8YFD-9J6N. The 2MP was created to
work in tandem with HAMP to assist homeowners who have a modification under HAMP
but have a second mortgage on the same property and may provide a modification or
principal reduction for that second mortgage. Second Lien Modification Program (2MP),
MAKINGHOMEAFFORDABLE.GOV (May 23, 2013) http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/
programs/lower-payments/Pages/lien_modification.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/
FG7Y-JJBB.
85
Press Release, Dep’t of Treas., Secretaries Geithner, Donovan Announce New Details
of Making Home Affordable Program, Highlight Implementation Progress (May 14, 2009),
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B. Amendments to Regulation Z
In another response to the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board
(“FRB”) promulgated amendments to Regulation Z, implementing
regulations for the Truth in Lending Act, effective October 1, 2009.86 The
FRB recognized that the low- or no- documentation loans contributed to
the burgeoning default rates and subsequent housing crisis by providing
high-priced mortgages to high-risk borrowers.87 The Regulation Z
amendments include restrictions on higher priced mortgage loans, which
have a lower APR floor and contemplate purchase money mortgages.88
The amendments also target deceptive advertising, which further clouds
the already difficult to understand subprime mortgage packages,
prohibits lenders and brokers from influencing appraisers, and prohibits
servicers from engaging in unfair servicing practices related to fees and
billing.89
C. The Dodd-Frank Act
In July 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).90 Title X of Dodd-Frank
creates the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) and details
its duties and powers.91 Besides creating the CFPB, Dodd-Frank
provides significant prohibitions and standards in mortgage lending.
The Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, found in Title
XIV of Dodd-Frank, substantially revises the Truth in Lending Act,
including mortgage origination and servicing practices, as well as
strengthens remedies available when lenders violate the law.92 For
example, Title XIV builds upon the FRB’s 2008 reforms and delineates
“qualified mortgage[s],” which are mortgages with safe underwriting
practices, lower fees, and an absence of risky features.93 Because these
available
at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg131.aspx,
archived at http://perma.cc/XC6E-G4V9.
86
See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
226) (indicating that Section 226.35(b)(3) had a separate effective date of April 1, 2010).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 44,586–90, 44,563.
90
See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301 et seq.).
91
Id. at 1964–2035.
92
Id. at 2136–2212.
93
Id. at 2145–48. On January 30, 2013 and June 12, 2013, the CFPB issued final
regulations amending Regulation Z and implementing the ability-to-repay and qualified
mortgage standards effective January 10, 2014. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage
Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408–20 (Jan. 30,
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qualified mortgages are sufficiently reliable and safe, the lender is
entitled to a “safe harbor,” i.e., a conclusive presumption that it satisfied
ability-to-pay requirements and a rebuttable presumption for higherpriced mortgage loans under regulations implementing these statutory
amendments.94
Dodd-Frank also prohibits steering incentives and yield spread
premiums, which are “payments made by a lender to a mortgage broker
upon origination for placing the borrower in a loan with riskier
terms . . . or a higher interest rate than the minimum rate required by the
lender.”95 Yield spread premiums have long been considered predatory
because they “provide[] a financial incentive for brokers to place
borrowers into more expensive, and oftentimes typically more risky,
mortgages”—the broker makes more money when he or she can
convince the homeowner to purchase this less-desirable mortgage
product.96
Further, Dodd-Frank amended the Truth in Lending Act to require
lenders to both verify the borrower’s income and ensure the borrower
has the ability to repay the loan over its full term.97 While this provision
seems perfectly logical, in the height of the housing boom of 2006
through 2007, lenders were not verifying either the borrower’s ability to
repay or the borrower’s income.98 As a result, “low-[document] loans
accounted for roughly 40% of newly[-]issued mortgages . . . [,]” and
“[f]or even riskier subprime loans, stated income loans may have
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026); Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage
Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 35,430–506 (June 12,
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).
94
See generally Qualified Mortgage Definition for HUD Insured and Guaranteed Single
Family Mortgages, 78 Fed. Reg. 59,890 (Sept. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pts. 201,
203, 1005, 1007) (discussing the safe harbor presumptions). Clearly, a tension exists with
respect to making loans available to qualified buyers while also ensuring that the buyer has
the ability to pay. In October 2014, federal agencies loosened regulations to increase the
flow of housing credit. "The government is in a tight spot. Some six years after the financial
crisis, thousands of apparently creditworthy borrowers are being shut out of the housing
market because they cannot get mortgages." Peter Eavis, U.S. Loosens Reins, but Mortgage
TIMES
(Oct.
22,
2014),
available
at
Lenders
Want
More
Slack,
N.Y.
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/22/u-s-loosens-reins-but-mortgage-lenders-wantmore-slack/, archived at http://perma.cc/C5Z7-6TAG.
95
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 2139–41 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639b); Linda Singer, Zachary Best, & Nina
Simon, Breaking Down Financial Reform: A Summary of the Major Consumer Protection Portions
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L.
2, 6 (2010).
96
Singer, supra note 95, at 6.
97
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 2142–43 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)).
98
Singer, supra note 95, at 7.
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exceeded 50%.”99 Moreover, evidence suggests that some banks were
not only willing to accept falsified loan applications, but were even
willing to help create them.100 A sample of 100 stated-income loans,
when compared to IRS records, found that “90% of the income was
exaggerated by 5% or more . . . [and] almost 60% of the stated amounts
were exaggerated by more than 50%.”101
Dodd-Frank also bans prepayment penalties for adjustable rate and
higher cost mortgages that are not “qualified mortgage[s],” and a lender
may not offer a fixed rate qualified loan with a prepayment penalty
without also offering the borrower a loan without a prepayment
penalty.102 Further, it addresses the teaser, or initial low payment rate,
which is often dramatically adjusted upward after the introductory
period.103 Under Dodd-Frank, lenders must provide a good faith
estimate of the amount the monthly payment will be after it adjusts or
resets.104
The Act also provides additional protections. Another predatory
practice Dodd-Frank addresses is including premiums, financed into the
mortgage’s principal, for expensive and often worthless credit or other
insurance.105 The Act also requires six months’ notice before the
mortgage interest rate resets from a fixed to a variable rate, as well as the
establishment of an escrow account for payment of taxes and insurance

Stephane Fitch, No-Doc Mortgages Are Back?!, FORBES (July 2, 2010), available at
http://www.forbes.com/2010/07/02/return-liar-loans-personal-finance-no-doc_print.
html, archived at http://perma.cc/945V-2DD5; Singer, supra note 95, at 7.
100
Singer, supra note 95, at 7.
101
Statement by Steven Krystofiak, Pres., Mortg. Brokers Ass’n for Responsible Lending,
to the Federal Reserve (Aug. 1, 2006), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
secrs/2006/august/20060801/op-1253/op-1253_3_1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
LG8E-37RQ (emphasis removed).
102
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 2149–53 (2010).
103
Id. at 2153–54.
104
Id. at 2154.
105
Singer, supra note 95, at 7. Before Dodd-Frank, it was common practice in the
subprime market to charge exorbitant premiums for unnecessary insurance, such as credit
insurance, and finance these premiums into the mortgage principal. Id. But see 124 Stat. at
2151 (stating that residential mortgage loans are to include credit unemployment insurance
where “the unemployment insurance premiums are reasonable, the creditor receives no
direct or indirect compensation in connection with the unemployment insurance
premiums, and the unemployment insurance premiums are paid pursuant to another
insurance contract and not paid to an affiliate of the creditor”). Under Dodd-Frank, no
residential mortgage loan secured by the homeowner’s principal dwelling may include
financing of “any credit life, credit disability, credit unemployment, or credit property
insurance, or any other accident, loss-of-income, life, or health insurance[.]” 124 Stat. at
2149–50.
99
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for certain higher-cost mortgages.106 Unfortunately, during the housing
boom, many homeowners refinanced into a loan they believed had a
lower monthly payment, only to discover that their payments were
actually higher because of taxes and insurance.107
The Dodd-Frank Act also puts restrictions on the use of force-placed
insurance, another predatory practice previously used by lenders.108
Housing counselors and pro bono attorneys frequently encounter
homeowners in disputes with their lenders over this issue.109 Forceplaced insurance is expensive hazard insurance that the servicer
imposes.110 While the mortgage contract may allow this insurance, all
too frequently, homeowners discover that this expensive insurance has
been force-placed even when the homeowner already has the required
insurance or when the servicer fails to cancel the force-placed policy after
the homeowner obtains the required insurance.111
One of the most interesting and potentially most effective aspects of
this legislation is that state attorneys general can enforce its provisions in
state court.112 It is too soon to assess Dodd-Frank’s impact, but it
Id. at 2154, 2178–81.
Singer, supra note 95, at 8.
108
124 Stat. at 2182–84 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006)). CFPB issued regulations
amending Regulation X and implementing the force-placed insurance restrictions, effective
January 10, 2014. Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10891–92 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1024).
109
See generally Stacy Johnson, Next Bank Scandal? Forced-Placed Homeowners Insurance,
MONEY TALKS NEWS (Nov. 15, 2010), http://www.moneytalksnews.com/2010/
11/15/next-bank-rip-off-forced-place-homeowners-insurance, archived at http://perma.cc/
U3HU-PLR7 (discussing problems that are present when individuals are forced into
foreclosure).
110
Singer, supra note 95, at 8.
111
See Jeff Horwitz, New Questions About Banks' Force-Placed Insurance Deals, AM. BANKER
(Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/176_70/force-placed-insurance1035821-1.html?zkPrintable=1&nopagination=1, archived at http://perma.cc/44RH-ZP3L
(analyzing the concept of forced-placed insurance); Jeff Horwitz, Ties to Insurers Could Land
Mortgage Servicers in More Trouble, AM. BANKER (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.american
banker.com/issues/175_216/ties-to-insurers-servicers-in-trouble-1028474-1.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/SQ2E-PBHF (explaining the problems that are present with forcedplaced insurance). See generally Johnson, supra note 109 (describing forced-placed
insurance). Force-placed insurance is generally much more expensive and covers much
less than homeowners insurance obtained by a borrower. See What’s in a Mortgage
Payment? MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, http://www.homeloanlearningcenter.com/mortgage
basics/whatsinamortgagepayment.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2011), archived at
http://perma.cc/VQW8-YWYQ (providing a description of what a mortgage payment is).
112
Singer, supra note 95, at 11. Singer discusses:
State attorneys general, and, as applicable, state regulators, can enforce
not only their own non-preempted state laws against federallychartered banks and thrifts, but also the CFPB regulations (though not
106
107
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specifically addresses many of the predatory practices seen during the
housing boom—abuses that have contributed to the foreclosure crisis we
continue to experience.113
In addition to provisions outlined above, Dodd-Frank responded to
criticisms that relaxed oversight and regulation contributed to the
foreclosure crisis. Specifically, Section 312 of Dodd-Frank mandates the
transfer of all functions of the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) by
merging it with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”),
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), the Federal
Reserve Board, and the CFPB.114 The OTS was a government agency but
did not receive a budget; instead, it was funded or paid by the financial
institutions it regulated, thus creating a potential conflict of interest since
it “depend[ed] on fees paid by the banks it regulates and compete[d]
with other regulators to land the largest financial firms,” and was
considered to have “an aggressively deregulatory stance toward the
mortgage lenders it regulated.”115 A program of “This American Life”
described a meeting where federal regulators were announcing a
campaign to lessen regulation to attract clients. At this meeting, a photo
was taken with OTS Director Gilleran holding a chainsaw to indicate
OTS’ willingness to cut through regulations.116 Not surprisingly, some of
the mortgage lenders with the most notorious and toxic mortgage
products—such as Countrywide and Washington Mutual—were among
the financial institutions regulated by OTS.117 Despite this regulatory
change, some argue that these rules may not prevent the next crisis. For
example, while the regulation tightened oversight of larger financial
the general ban on unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices in the
absence of the rule). Act §§ 1042(a)(2), 1047. Thus, federal law and
regulations provide both an engine and a floor, not a ceiling, for
enforcement.
Id. (footnote omitted).
113
Id. at 13. The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission’s report suggested that predatory
practices during the housing boom, such as lenders offering complex mortgage products
while targeting high-risk buyers, contributed to the current foreclosure crisis. FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 22, at 447.
114
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 312, Pub. L. No. 111203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1522 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412).
115
Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator Played Advocate over
Enforcer: Agency Let Lenders Grow Out of Control, Then Fail, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/22/AR20081122022
13.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P5M9-CXGH.
116
This American Life: The Watchmen, THE AMERICAN LIFE (June 5, 2009), http://www.this
americanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/382/transcript, archived at http://perma.cc/
963M-4JD5.
117
See Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 115 (analyzing OTS’s effectiveness as a
regulator).
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institutions, it exempted “small[] banks [who] could still choose their
own regulator . . . [and] seek out the most lenient oversight.”118
As noted above, the credit rating agencies (“CRAs”), such as
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch, were also thought to contribute
to the financial crisis through ratings of mortgage-backed securities
which were ultimately found to be vastly less creditworthy than their
original rating indicated, certainly not the “safe investment” that the
rating implied.119 Similar to criticism of the payment system of the OTS,
where the regulated entities choose and pay the agency that regulates
them, the CRAs (aside from Egan-Jones) employ an “issuer pays” model:
the “certified CRAs are paid by the issuers of the bonds that the CRA
rates.”120 In fact, the Justice Department, the District of Columbia, and
sixteen states, including Indiana and Illinois, have joined together to sue
Standard & Poor’s for “misrepresenting its independence and objectivity
when it placed high ratings on what were, in many cases, ‘worthless
securities.’”121
Alternatives to this payment model have been proposed, and DoddFrank required the “[Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)] and
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) [to] submit reports that
would investigate alternative business (revenue [and] compensation)

Daniel Wagner & Stevenson Jacobs, New Financial Rules Might Not Prevent the Next
Crisis, HUFF. POST (May 23, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/23/newfinancial-rules-might_n_586511.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9H6J-RQZL.
119
See generally Lawrence J. White, Credit Rating Agencies: An Overview 2, 20–23 (N.Y.U.
Stern Sch. Bus., Working Paper, Revised Draft May 19, 2013), available at http://webdocs.stern.nyu.edu/old_web/economics/docs/workingpapers/2013/White_CRAsARFE_J
un2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/B8F9-25WV (discussing CRAs and their role in the
recent financial crisis).
120
Id. at 9.
121
Complaint at 3–5, State v. McGraw Hill Fin., Inc., No. 49D03-1306-PL-025757 (Marion
Co. Sup. Ct. June 27, 2013); see Kristena Hansen, Arizona, Other States Sue Standard & Poor’s
Over Ratings on Mortgage Investments, PHOENIX BUS. J. (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/news/2013/02/05/arizona-other-states-suestandard.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4HCE-QZP2 (discussing Arizona’s entry into
the suit); see also Jessica M. Karmasek, Majority of States Suing S&P Say They’re Handling Case
In-House, LEGAL NEWSLINE (Mar. 18, 2013), http://legalnewsline.com/issues/financialcrisis/240202-majority-of-states-suing-sp-say-theyre-handling-case-in-house, archived at
http://perma.cc/68FP-A3AK (providing details on how many states have joined the
lawsuit); Press Release, Office of the Ind. Att’y Gen., Indiana Files Lawsuit Against
Standard & Poor’s (June 28, 2013), available at http://www.in.gov/activecalendar/
EventList.aspx?view=EventDetails&eventidn=108778&information_id=183780&type=&syn
dicate=syndicate (last visited Apr. 12, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/89T-WC3W
(providing details about Indiana’s suit against Standard & Poor’s); Rob Varnon, U.S. Ct and
15 States Suing S&P Over MBS Ratings During Housing Boom, CONN. POST (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://blog.ctnews.com/financialmines/2013/02/05/its-official-u-s-suing-sp-over-mbsratings-during-housing-boom/, archived at http://perma.cc/MKG8-3QF6.
118
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models for CRAs . . . .”122 One proposal is to have the Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) randomly select from a list of qualified
CRAs for a particular bond issuer and that issuer would pay the CRA
but also be able to hire additional CRAs.123 Nonetheless, at this time,
CRAs (except Egan-Jones) are still paid by the issuer that seeks to have
its bond rated.124
IV. STATE RESPONSES TO THE MORTGAGE CRISIS
States have also undertaken efforts to mitigate the effects of the
foreclosure crisis.
These efforts, described below, have made a
significant contribution to addressing the fallout of the crisis and
hardships faced by homeowners. Part IV.A starts by introducing
robosigning and servicer abuses.125 Next, Part IV.B attempts to protect
individuals from these practices.126 Part IV.C further discusses the
Midwestern attempts to solve the foreclosure problem.127 Finally, Part
IV.D introduces the release of the Indiana Foreclosure Prevention
Network.128
A. Robosigning, Servicer Abuses, and the National Mortgage Foreclosure
Multistate
In October 2010, a number of newspapers began using the term
“robosigning” to refer to the practice of a Bank of America official
signing up to eight thousand foreclosure documents a month without
reading them.129 Other allegations arose regarding improperly notarized
documents and forged signatures.130 Additional major banks, including
GMAC Mortgage and JPMorgan Chase, joined Bank of America in
halting tens of thousands of foreclosure cases after similar problems in
White, supra note 119, at 28–30.
Id. at 30.
124
Id. at 9.
125
See infra Part IV.A (explaining the concept of robosigning).
126
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the Indiana Mortgage Task Force).
127
See infra Part IV.C (analyzing Midwestern attempts to solve foreclosure problems).
128
See infra Part IV.D (discussing the Prevention Network and other foreclosure hotlines).
129
See, e.g., Jenifer B. McKim, Lenders on Autopilot: Using Robo-Signers to Process Thousands
of Foreclosures Opens Banks Up to Legal Risks, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 2, 2010, at B7 (defining
“robo-signers” as employees of lenders who blindly initial foreclosure paperwork without
reading the documents).
130
See Ariana Eunjung Cha & Dina Elboghdady, 50 State Attorneys General Announce
Foreclosure Probe, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/10/12/AR2010101205604.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
T4UD-X6YE (reporting on a multistate investigation aimed at determining whether lenders
have been forging signatures and improperly notarizing documents).
122
123
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their foreclosure departments became public.131 A Bank of America
executive admitted, “I typically don’t read them because of the volume
that we sign.”132 In the twenty-three states that utilize a judicial
foreclosure proceeding, this admission raised questions as to whether
these entities were submitting fraudulent documents to the court.133 The
Summary Judgment and Default Judgment Affidavits, in which the issue
arose, require the signer affirm, under penalty of perjury, that he or she
has authorization to make the affidavit, he or she has personal
knowledge of the content of the affidavit, and the information contained
in the affidavit is factually correct.134
The general outrage expressed in response to the robosigning
debacle is understandable given the importance and implications of this
practice. It is critical to both the homeowner and the judicial process that
the information in these affidavits be accurate. The affidavit states the
critical elements of the plaintiff’s case: the plaintiff is the holder of the
promissory note and thereby has the right to sue; the defendant is in
default; and the total amount of the unpaid principal balance and the

See McKim, supra note 129 (discussing how other banks followed Bank of America’s
lead in handling the foreclosure problems).
132
Alan Zibel, Bank of America Delays Foreclosures in 23 States, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2010),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/oct/2/bank-america-delays-foreclosures23-states/, archived at http://perma.cc/LMK5-5CUR. The FHA suggests that Fannie Mae’s
failure to oversee its attorney network through an operational risk management program
contributed to the robosigning debacle. See FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, OFF. OF INSPECTOR
GEN., EVALUATION OF FHFA’S OVERSIGHT OF FANNIE MAE’S MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL
RISK 12 (Sept. 23, 2011), available at http://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/EVL-2011004.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZF-5837 (discussing Fannie Mae’s lack of an
operational risk management program).
133
EVALUATION OF FHFA’S OVERSIGHT OF FANNIE MAE, supra note 132, at 20 (discussing
the possibility of fraudulent documents being filed with the courts); Zibel, supra note 132
(distinguishing the “lengthy court process” in these twenty three states from non-judicial
foreclosure states where lenders can quickly foreclose on delinquent borrowers).
134
Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Hous. And Cmty. Opportunity, 111th Cong. 13 (2010)
(testimony of Adam J. Levitin, Professor of Law at Georgetown University of Law Center),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg63124/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg63124.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/JBD3-FVVH. “When a servicer files an affidavit that claims to
be based on personal knowledge, but is not in fact based on personal knowledge, the
servicer is committing a fraud on the court, and quite possibly perjury.” Id. The affidavit
must state: “I AFFIRM, UNDER THE PENALTIES FOR PERJURY, THAT THE
FOREGOING REPRESENTATIONS ARE TRUE.” See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff’s Motion by Plaintiff, a “Person Entitled to Enforce” Note Pursuant to IC § 26-13.1-301, for Summary and Default Judgment Entry and Decree of Foreclosure at
“Affidavit,” Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Smidt, No. 29D01-1111-MF-11408 (Sup. Ct. Hamilton Co.
Nov. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Smidt Memorandum].
131
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due interest is owed.135 The affidavit also delineates advances, late
charges, and costs of collection.136 Thus, if incorrect information is
presented to the court, the homeowner may be adjudged to owe more
money in arrearage after the home is sold than is actually owed,
resulting in greater ongoing financial distress, and in many cases, the
necessity that the homeowner file for bankruptcy protection.137
Second, the homeowner is unrepresented in the vast majority of
foreclosure cases.138 While some jurisdictions may have pro bono
services available to the homeowner, he or she is in financial distress by
facing foreclosure and is typically unable to afford to hire a private
attorney.139 This is important because when both parties secure
attorneys, the homeowner’s attorney will raise issues of inaccuracy or

Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing, supra
note 134, at 13.
136
See Smidt Memorandum, supra note 134 (detailing the information that must be stated
in an affidavit); Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage
Servicing, supra note 134, at 15 (providing commentary on the problem of servicers charging
"junk fees" related to foreclosure actions and the “growing evidence of servicers requesting
payment for services not performed or for which there was no contractual right to
payment”).
137
A federal bankruptcy court found:
There is no doubt that the unrelenting actions of [the mortgage
servicer] drove the [homeowners] into bankruptcy. They were not
delinquent on any other debts, and they filed bankruptcy as an
“eleventh hour” mechanism to prevent the loss of their home. [The
mortgage servicer’s] conduct throughout this factual scenario
represents the most callous and egregious effort to collect an
indebtedness that was never owed that this court has been called upon
to review. Succinctly stated, [the mortgage servicer’s] incompetent
servicing tactics converted a loan transaction that was being paid like
“clockwork” to a loan that was virtually impossible to pay, particularly
for most modest income borrowers.
In re Cothern, 442 B.R. 494, 499 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2010).
138
The Need for National Mortgage Servicing Standards: Hearing Before S. Subcomm. on Hous.,
Trans., and Cmty. Dev. 22, n.1 (May 12, 2011) (testimony of Diane E. Thompson, counsel for
the National Consumer Law Center, http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_
mortgage/mortgage_servicing/testimony-thompson-mortgage-servicing-standards.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/75CG-LR9K [hereinafter The Need for National Mortgage
Servicing Standards].
139
Brian Reed, Lawyers Make Pro Bono Leap into Foreclosures, NPR (May 17, 2009),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=104063764,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/6RAE-FWET. In Indiana, the Supreme Court and the OAG partnered
together to train more than 1000 pro bono attorneys to represent homeowners in
foreclosure settlement conferences. Press Release, Sup. Ct. of Ind., 1000 Trained to Handle
Foreclosure Cases: Indiana Supreme Court Offers New Pledge of Support (Oct. 19, 2009),
available
at
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/press/2009/1019b.html,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/5AXG-V7M2.
135
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mortgage fraud to the judge’s attention.140 In contrast, an unrepresented
homeowner is not in a position to know if he or she has been victimized
by fraud or if the information the plaintiff presented is correct—not only
does the homeowner fail to raise objections, but in many instances, he or
she does not even enter an appearance in the case.141
It is not the judge’s role to represent the homeowner, and many
judges rely on the honesty and integrity of the lender-plaintiffs and their
attorneys.142 In fact, before the robosigning debacle, many judges
assumed the paperwork presented to them was correct and therefore did
not examine the claims of lender-plaintiffs carefully, almost rubberstamping uncontested foreclosure actions.143 Not surprisingly, attorneys
representing lenders in foreclosure cases have also come under fire for
allegedly filing fraudulent documents in foreclosure actions.144
In response to the serious allegations involved in the execution of
robosigned documents, attorneys general from all fifty states, as well as a
number of federal agencies, joined together in a multistate investigation
in October 2010 to examine the practices of mortgage lenders implicated
in the robosigning debacle.145 This investigation ended in a joint federal
140
See The Need for National Mortgage Servicing Standards, supra note 138, at 22 (“Judges are
unlikely to detect errors in a servicer's documentation where the homeowner goes
unrepresented”).
141
Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing, supra
note 134, at 12–13. Levitin explains that “the norm in foreclosure cases is a default
judgment.” Id. at 12. Further, “[m]ost borrowers do not appear in court or contest their
foreclosures, and not all of those who do are represented by competent counsel, not least
because of the difficulties in paying for counsel.” Id. at 12–13.
142
The Need for National Mortgage Servicing Standards, supra note 138, at 22.
143
See Dean Calbreath, Foreclosure Procedure in Review: ‘Foreclosure Mills’ and ‘RoboSigners’ Raise Questions About Integrity of the Paperwork with Homeowners, Buyers and
Investors, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Oct. 31, 2010, at C1 (discussing the judges’ lack of a role
in foreclosures).
144
John Schwartz, Judges Berate Bank Lawyers in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/business/11lawyers.html?page
wanted=all&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/R4WT-GY7R.
145
See PHILIP A. LEHMAN, NATIONAL MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF
MULTISTATE/FEDERAL SETTLEMENT OF FORECLOSURE MISCONDUCT CLAIMS 1, available at
http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/About_the_Office/Cases/National_Mort
gage_Settlement/National_Settlement_Executive_Summary.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/8VRS-ZXE5 (discussing the nationwide effort to investigate mortgage
lenders); Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys Gen., 50 States Sign Mortgage Foreclosure
Joint Statement (Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://www.naag.org/joint-statement-of-themortgage-foreclosure-multistate-group.php, archived at http://perma.cc/N7HJ-5BQH
(“Fifty state Attorneys General have joined this coordinated multistate effort.”). This group
includes the Department of Justice and the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Federal Government
and State Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage
Servicers to Address Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012),
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and multistate settlement against the five largest lending servicers, and is
the second-largest civil settlement ever obtained by the state attorneys
The results of this investigation confirmed bank
general.146
representatives routinely executed documents without personal
knowledge of the facts contained therein and, frequently, without the
presence of a notary public, in violation of law.147
The settlement includes five major programs. First, $1.5 billion will
be distributed to homeowners who were victims of unfair mortgage
servicing or foreclosure practices, each of whom will receive
approximately $2000.148 Second, $2.5 billion will be distributed to the
forty-nine participating states, which is to be used for state foreclosure
prevention efforts such as housing counseling, help lines, mediation
programs, legal services, and assistance for blighted neighborhoods.149
Third, under the settlement, the banks are required to expend at least
$3 billion on refinance programs “[t]o assist homeowners who are not
delinquent on their payments but cannot refinance to lower rates
because of negative equity.”150 To qualify for this refinance program,
eligible homeowners “must be current on mortgage payments, have a

available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/February/12-ag-186.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/3MAA-66LP.
146
Federal Government & Attorneys General Reach Landmark Settlement with Major Banks,
NAT’L MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT (DEC. 8, 2014), http://www.nationalmortgage
settlement.com/, archived at http://perma.cc/T3QC-MLBC. Bank of America Corp.,
Citigroup Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Company, Residential Capital, LLC, and Wells Fargo
& Company represent approximately 60% of the mortgage servicing market. Adam J.
Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 25, n.73 (2011) (indicating
that 60% of the market is comprised of the five largest mortgage providers); Nat’l Ass’n of
Attorneys Gen. State Attorneys General, Feds Reach $25 Billion Settlement with Five
Largest Mortgage Servicers on Foreclosure Wrongs (2013), available at
http://naag.org/state-attorneys-general-feds-reach-25-billion-settlement-with-five-largestmortgage-servicers-on-foreclosure-wrongs.php, archived at http://perma.cc/KLT7-R23P
(explaining the $25 billion settlement with the mortgage servicers); LEHMAN, supra note
145, at 1 (claiming that the settlement “represents the largest financial recovery obtained by
the attorneys general except for the 1998 Master Tobacco Settlement”).
147
Evan Bedard, Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure, Part II;
Statement by Sheila C. Bair, LOANSAFE.ORG (Dec. 1, 2010), http://www.loansafe.org/
problems-in-mortgage-servicing-from-modification-to-foreclosure-part-ii-statement-bysheila-c-bair, archived at http://perma.cc/73XU-SPZ2.
148
LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 4. These homeowners do not have to release any private
claims they may have against their lender to receive this payment. Id.
149
Id. Oklahoma was the only state that did not join in the foreclosure settlement. Loren
Berlin & Emily Peck, National Mortgage Settlement: States, Big Banks Reach $25 Billion Deal
[Update], HUFF. POST (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/09/
national-mortgage-settlement_n_1265292.html, archived at http://perma.cc/45NC-MPJK.
150
LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 2.
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loan to value ratio in excess of 100%, and must have a current interest
rate in excess of 5.25%.”151
Fourth, the settlement provides for an enhanced loss-mitigation
program, in which the five banks will expend approximately $17 billion
in relief for persons who are delinquent on their mortgages.152 The banks
are required to spend 60% of the $17 billion to reduce the principal
balance of under-water home loans (principal reduction), and an
additional $5.2 billion for other forms of homeowner relief, such as
facilitation of short sales and homeowner unemployment payment
forbearance which defers payments for homeowners who have lost or
are between jobs.153
Finally, the settlement includes more than forty pages of significant
reforms of mortgage loan servicing. Besides the robosigning allegations,
homeowners have long been plagued by a variety of servicer errors and
abuses.154 The Indiana OAG, as well as other offices of attorneys general,
legal services programs, and housing counselors, receive thousands of
homeowner complaints against servicers.155 Many of these borrowers
are facing foreclosure and are seeking to save his or her home through a
loss-mitigation option.156 Certainly the worst servicer abuse is wrongful
or erroneous foreclosure. One expert analyst in the foreclosure arena
explains it this way:
At this week’s hearings on mortgage servicing and
robosigning . . . members of Congress asked the usual
unimaginative question, “[A]ren’t all these borrowers
delinquent, so that foreclosure is inevitable?” The
answer to this question comes in two parts:
(1) No.
(2) Even homeowners who are indeed delinquent
should not be foreclosed in the current housing
market if any reasonable workout is possible.

Id.
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 3.
155
Press Release, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr., Mortgage Servicers Continue to Wrongfully
Foreclose on Homeowners According to a Recent National Survey of Consumer Attorneys
(Feb. 22, 2012), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/pr-wrongful-foreclosuresurvey-results.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SK8F-ZTXK.
156
RoboSigning, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing, supra
note 134, at 7 (explaining that, “[l]oss mitigation is considered an alternative to foreclosure,
and includes activities such as repayment plans, loan modifications, short sales, and deeds
in lieu of foreclosure”).
151
152
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Erroneous foreclosures thus come in two flavors.
Foreclosing someone who is not actually behind, or
whose default was precipitated by junk fees,
unnecessary or overpriced forced-place insurance, or
payment application errors (common in bankruptcy
cases) is obviously wrong. Equally wrong, however, are
foreclosures of homeowners who have sufficient income
to fund a modified loan that will produce significantly
higher investor returns than a distressed foreclosure
sale. Contrary to the pronouncements of servicers and
Treasury
officials,
modification
and
workout
consideration is not happening before foreclosure starts,
it runs on a parallel track with foreclosure processes.
Frequently, the foreclosure train wins the race.157
The Servicing Standards contain a number of critical reforms, found
in Exhibit A of the settlement Consent Judgment.158 First, in response to
the robosigning debacle, the settlement delineates standards for
documents used in foreclosure and bankruptcy proceedings.159 For
example, the servicer must ensure that factual assertions made in
foreclosure pleadings or bankruptcy proofs of claim are accurate,
complete, and supported by reliable evidence that substantiates the
homeowner’s default and the servicer’s right to foreclose.160 Further, all
affidavits, sworn statements, and declarations must be based on personal
knowledge and submitted in accordance with the applicable state and
federal law.161
Another important reform requires servicers to send homeowners a
notice before foreclosure that includes a summary of loss-mitigation
options that were offered to the homeowner, facts supporting the
lender’s right to foreclose, and a plain-language account summary.162
The notice must also inform the homeowner that he or she may receive
certain documents upon request, such as a copy of the loan note and the
identity of the investor holding the loan.163
157
Alan White, Erroneous Foreclosures, CREDIT SLIPS (Nov. 18, 2010, 9:38 AM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2010/11/erroneous-foreclosures.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/X7R2-4Z59.
158
See generally United States v. Bank of Am., No. 1:2012cv00361, Ex. A (D.D.C. 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/bank-of-america-consent-judgement.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/624L-TTQD (providing the critical reforms).
159
LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 3.
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
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One of the most important reforms restricts “dual-tracking,” a
practice in which the lender continues to pursue a judgment for
foreclosure in court while simultaneously negotiating with the
homeowner to preserve his or her home through a loss-mitigation
option.164 Needless to say, this practice creates a tremendous amount of
confusion at best and the appearance of deceit and unfairness at worst.165
Under this dual-track system, the homeowner may receive a judgment
for foreclosure while working in earnest with the servicer to provide
information about the homeowner’s eligibility for a loss-mitigation
workout.166
Under the settlement, banks must thoroughly evaluate the
homeowner for available loss-mitigation options before referral to an
attorney to file for foreclosure.167 The servicer must cease all collection
efforts if the homeowner is under review for a modification, and the
servicer must halt foreclosure activities if the homeowner is current on a
trial modification, forbearance, repayment plan, or if a short sale or
deed-in-lieu of foreclosure has been approved by all parties.168 Further,
if a sheriff sale is delayed for loss-mitigation purposes, the servicer must
notify the homeowner of any new sale date.169
Another important contribution of the settlement is the
establishment of specific timelines for loan modification and short sale
applications.170 Further, the servicer must assign a single point of contact
(“SPOC”) to most first-lien borrowers and establish e-portals so that
homeowners may be informed of their loan modification status and to
ensure that documents submitted for loan modification consideration
may be tracked.171
These servicer reforms will be of tremendous assistance because one
of the most problematic and ubiquitous of servicer abuses involves the

164
See Dean Calbreath, Some Want to Stop Dual Track of Loan Mods, Foreclosures: Vargas
Stopped Bill That Would Have Held Off Home Auctions, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Sept. 17,
2011), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/sep/17/some-want-stop-dual-trackloan-mods-foreclosures/, archived at http://perma.cc/9TSB-AA2M (explaining the “dualtrack system”).
165
See id. (noting that the dual-track system can be “‘unnecessarily confusing’”).
166
Id.
167
LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 3.
168
See id. at 1, 3 (noting servicers’ deceptive practices and the settlement’s attempt to curb
those practices).
169
Id. at 2–3.
170
Id. at 3.
171
Id.
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difficulty homeowners have in communicating with servicers.172 To
become eligible for a modification or other loss-mitigation option, the
homeowner must fax a great deal of information to the lender and the
court, including, among other things, recent bank account information
and tax returns.173 Frequently, the servicer tells the homeowner the
servicer failed to receive the information and the homeowner is
In some instances, this
repeatedly asked to send it again.174
communication error involves the transmission of a required signature
on the document in which the homeowner accepts a loss-mitigation
option.175 The homeowner sends the signed document to the servicer,
often more than once, and then receives a notice that his or her loan
modification was denied because the signed document was not sent in a
timely manner.176 Homeowners are not the only ones who experience
communication problems in the foreclosure process; the OAG, housing
counselors, and legal services attorneys also experience communication
breakdowns with servicers.177 Thus, the settlement also requires the
establishment and use of a secure online e-portal system to enhance and
track loss mitigation related communication.178

Complaint at 28, United States v. Bank of Am., No. 1:12-cv-00361 (D.D.C. 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/hce/documents/scra_global_servicing
comp.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ARF3-ZSLR.
173
See IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-4.7 (2012) (defining the “‘loss mitigation package’”);
Foreclosure Notices and Loss Mitigation Package, IND. FORECLOSURE PREVENTION NETWORK
(July 7, 2011), http://www.877gethope.org/news/foreclosure-notices-and-loss-mitigationpackage, archived at http://perma.cc/HQ9P-A8UR (discussing the requirement that the
borrowers provide the lender and the court with a loss mitigation package); see also
Settlement Conference Loss Mitigation Package Checklist, IND. FORECLOSURE PREVENTION
NETWORK, http://www.877gethope.org/generated/Loss-Mitigation-Package.pdf (last
visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/4QEL-2FAJ (providing a checklist of
required documents for the Loss Mitigation Package, including recent bills for all expenses,
pay stubs for all employment, current bank statements, and tax returns from the last two
years).
174
See Press Release, Sup. Ct. of Ind., Secure Network Set-Up to Help Housing Lenders
and
Borrowers
Exchange
Information
(Apr.
11,
2011),
available
at
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/media-press-releases-2011.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/JA2N-5BZ8 (discussing communication problems between major parties
involved in foreclosure actions and suggesting that the implementation of the Mediation
Portal Project will reduce these communication errors).
175
See id. (noting that parties frequently fail to exchange important documents and
communications in loss mitigation programs).
176
See id. (suggesting that most of the loss mitigation efforts during the relevant periods
were unsuccessful because the parties were unprepared).
177
See id. (acknowledging instances where parties were failing to exchange proper
documents and communications because of communication problems).
178
See id. (explaining that the Mediation Portal Project is designed to improve
communication between borrowers, counsel, and servicers in loss mitigation efforts).
172
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Finally, the settlement imposes important restrictions on default fees,
late fees, third-party fees, and force-placed insurance.179 For example, a
servicer cannot charge loan modification application fees for proprietary
(first or second liens) modifications, and attorneys may charge
“reasonable and customary fees” for work actually performed.180 Thus,
if the foreclosure is terminated because the homeowner has been
accepted for a loss-mitigation option, the homeowner may be charged
only for attorney work that was actually performed.
The settlement will be enforced by an outside monitor who reports
to state attorneys general, and servicers will have to pay significant
penalties if found noncompliant with the settlement.181 The monitor has
issued his fourth compliance report.182 Noncompliance may be enforced
by the courts.183
B. The Indiana Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force
More than a year before the robosigning settlement was announced,
the Indiana OAG acted quickly to protect homeowners from these
ongoing servicer abuses and the robosigning debacle by filing a petition
to the Indiana Supreme Court to establish Best Practices for mortgage
foreclosure cases.184 The major substance of the Best Practices Petition
grew out of a series of meetings and discussions of the Indiana Supreme
Court Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force (“Task Force”), comprised of
court employees, state judges, the OAG, legal services attorneys, and
lender attorneys.185 The Task Force examined the robosigning issue as
well as reported cases and common fact situations where homeowners

LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 3.
WASH. ATT’Y GEN, RETURN INTEGRITY & ACCURACY TO FORECLOSURE AND
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 8, available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/
About_the_Office/Cases/National_Mortgage_Settlement/Servicing%20Standards%20Hig
hlights.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PJ7S-J9GL.
181
Id.; LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 3–4.
182
Continued Oversight, OFFICE OF MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT OVERSIGHT (Dec. 16, 2014),
https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/reports/continued-oversight/, archived at
https://perma.cc/7V6M-RBPF.
183
LEHMAN, supra note 145, at 1.
184
Am. Pet. for an Order, In re Mortg. Foreclosure Best Practices, No. 94 S 00-1101-MS00003 (Ind. Jan. 5, 2001), available at http://www.in.gov/portal/news_events/
files/Petition_SC_MortgageForeclosureBestPractices.FILESTAMPED.1.3.11.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/KSC8-499K [hereinafter In re Mortg. Foreclosure Best Practices].
185
Press Release, Office of Ind. Att’y Gen., Best Practices Sought to Thwart Foreclosure
Violations: Zoeller Petitions Indiana Supreme Court to Set New Requirements for Lenders
(Jan. 3, 2011), available at http://www.in.gov/portal/news_events/65076.htm, archived at
http://perma.cc/QKA5-2BJW.
179
180
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faced abusive tactics by servicers.186 The Task Force developed Best
Practices whereby Indiana courts could ensure the rule of law was being
followed and homeowners facing foreclosure were properly protected.187
The first few paragraphs of the Best Practices address the issue of
documentation—has the plaintiff filed the appropriate paperwork to
prove that he or she has the right to sue?188 A lender must do the
following: (1) demonstrate that it is a “person entitled to enforce” the
mortgage; (2) state which Indiana code section it seeks to enforce, i.e., as
a holder of the note or as a transferee; and (3) provide the proper
documentation for that claim, including producing the original note if
requested by the court or a copy of the note with endorsements as
required by Indiana law.189 If the original note has been lost, the plaintiff
must follow the required procedures and attach an affidavit setting forth
the appropriate assertions.190
While this documentation was already required under Indiana law,
some lenders’ attorneys were flouting the law by failing to provide this
necessary paperwork.191 Because most foreclosures are uncontested, and
therefore, the homeowner is not represented by an attorney, lenders
were unable to file adequate paperwork.192 Like robosigning, when the
inadequate paperwork issue came to light, it created public outrage. The

186
See id. (providing Attorney General Greg Zoeller’s description of the issues requested
to be addressed by Indiana Supreme Court in the Petition).
187
Id. The OAG Petition contained stronger language than the Best Practices. For
example, the Petition sought to make the Best Practices requirements in foreclosure actions
and it used the mandatory “shall” rather than the permissive “should.” Am. Pet. for an
Order, supra note 184, at 4. The Petition called attention to the practice of robosigning and
servicer abuses and prompted legislative changes. Ultimately, in its Order, the Indiana
Supreme Court concluded that, “in light of the relatively frequent changes within the
mortgage industry . . . it would be more advantageous to keep these Best Practices fluid,
and to request that they be continually updated by the Supreme Court’s Mortgage
Foreclosure Task Force.” In re Mortg. Foreclosure Best Practices, No. 94 S 00-1101-MS-3,
slip op. at 2 (Ind. Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-other2011-94s00-1101-ms-3a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8QL5-6ZT3.
188
See DIV. OF STATE CT. ADMIN., MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES 2 (Nov. 2012),
available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/files/mortgage-mortgage-foreclosurebest-practices.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/C9ZD-F8MB [hereinafter MORTGAGE
FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES] (delineating the assertions and documentation a, “person
entitled to enforce,” a negotiable interest must provide to the court in a foreclosure action).
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
See Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing,
supra note 134, at 18 (noting that filing foreclosure complaints without attaching the note
“appears to be routine practice” for some law firms).
192
See id. at 12–13, 18 (discussing default judgments in foreclosure cases and noting that
“[m]any foreclosure complaints are facially defective and should be dismissed because they
fail to attach the note”).
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press highlighted cases where courts voided foreclosures when it
determined that the lender had failed to demonstrate a proper chain of
title.193
The Best Practices also require the courts to send a separate third
notice to homeowners, alerting them of their right to seek a settlement
conference.194 This additional notice enhances the effectiveness of the
Mortgage Foreclosure Trial Court Assistance Project (“MFTCAP”),
which was “created to assist trial courts in scheduling and conducting
mortgage foreclosure settlement conferences.”195 Under this program,
court-appointed facilitators contact homeowners facing foreclosure to
“ensure they are aware of their right to a settlement conference, and to
bring both parties to the table to try to find a mutually-agreeable
settlement, or workout.”196 The MFTCAP began as a pilot program in
February 2010, and its success has been striking.197 In MFTCAP pilot
counties, nearly 47% of homeowners request a settlement conference,
193
See Gretchen Morgenson, Massachusetts Ruling on Foreclosures is a Warning to Banks,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/
business/08mortgage.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Q8UQ-4R6T (discussing a
Massachusetts court’s decision to void foreclosures based on incomplete paperwork).
194
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 3. This would be the
third notice requirement. See IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-8 (providing pre-suit notice
requirements for creditors filing actions for foreclosure in Indiana). The lender sends the
first and second notices to the homeowner. Id. The first notice, sent thirty days before
foreclosure is filed, informs the homeowner that foreclosure is imminent and gives
information about contacting a housing counselor. Id. The homeowner receives the second
notice as part of the summons attached to the foreclosure complaint. Id.; see also DIV. ST.
CT. ADMIN., MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE TRIAL COURT ASSISTANCE PROJECT, SAMPLE SUMMONS
(FOR CREDITOR ATTORNEYS), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/files/
mortgage-summons.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/K9T5UBJM (providing a sample summons). The summons states:
All courts should send a separate communication to each mortgage
foreclosure defendant informing the defendant of his or her right to
participate in a settlement conference. The notice sent by the lender as
required by the statute does not routinely generate an appreciable
response rate, whereas the single-sheet notice sent by our pilot courts
has resulted in a settlement conference request rate of approximately
45 percent.
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 3; see supra Part IV (explaining
how mortgage fraud contributed to the Midwest housing crisis).
195
James F. Maguire, Mortgage Foreclosure Trial Court Assistance Project, IND. CT. TIMES
(Sept. 13, 2010), http://indianacourts.us/times/2010/09/mftcap/, archived at
http://perma.cc/HDC3-E469. See Rebecca Berfanger, Court Programs, Economy Among
LAWYER
(Nov.
24,
2010),
Focuses
of
Foreclosure
Conference,
IND.
http://www.theindianalawyer.com/court-programs-economy-among-focuses-offoreclosure-conference/PARAMS/article/25214, archived at http://perma.cc/L2NW-BPJK
(noting that the MFTCAP has been helping Indiana homeowners since March 2010).
196
Maguire, supra note 195 (internal quotation marks omitted).
197
See id. (praising the program’s success).
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compared with fewer than 15% in counties without MFTCAP.198
Further, 51.2% of the settlement conferences that take place in these pilot
counties result in a workout.199 In short, though only twenty-six of the
ninety-two Indiana counties participate in MFTCAP, 25% all Indiana
borrowers negotiate a foreclosure-prevention agreement under this
program.200 In contrast, the workout rate in counties without MFTCAP
is substantially lower.201
To further facilitate the MFTCAP’s effectiveness, the Best Practices
also include a provision requiring lenders to provide more contact
information for the homeowner than just the homeowner’s address.202
To preserve the homeowner’s privacy and avoid further exposing the
homeowner to foreclosure rescue scams, any additional contact
information beyond the address is not publicly available.203 The Best
Practices require the lender to file an affidavit regarding evidence that
the homeowner no longer resides at the home and attach an exhibit
detailing any default of an earlier foreclosure prevention agreement.204
The Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force and Settlement Conference Statistics, DIV. STATE CT.
ADMIN., http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/2364.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/9QE5-T425.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id. The Indiana Supreme Court estimates that “each averted foreclosure saves local
communities and stakeholders around $40,000.” Id. Thus, “from April 2010 to December
2013, the MFTCAP has preserved more than $217 million of value in Indiana
communities.” Id.
202
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 2.
203
Id. The Best Practices state:
At the time the Complaint is filed, Plaintiff should provide to the Clerk
a service list, including the name, address, and, if available, the
telephone number and/or email address for each individual defendant
debtor who signed the mortgage. Because many defendant debtors
have been and continue to be targeted by illegal foreclosure “rescue
agencies[,”] this service list should comport with the public access
exclusions of Administrative Rule 9(H)(1).
Id. See supra Part IV.D (explaining the rise of foreclosure fraud by rescue agencies).
204
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 187, at 3. Best Practices further
reads:
If Plaintiff maintains that the Defendant does not qualify for a
settlement conference under § 32-30-10.5-8(e)(1), loan secured by a
dwelling not the debtor’s primary residence, then Plaintiff’s counsel
should attach as an Exhibit to the Complaint any evidence in Plaintiff’s
possession establishing that the debtor does not personally reside at
such address. If counsel cannot provide such evidence, the debtor
should be sent a copy of the “Get Help—Get Hope” form prescribed
by []§ 32-30-10.5[,]
198

If Plaintiff maintains that the Defendant does not qualify for a
settlement conference under []§ 32-30-10.5-8(e)(2), default of a prior
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A false claim that the homeowner abandoned his or her home or that the
homeowner defaulted on a previous loss-mitigation opportunity may
result in the denial of the homeowner’s rights.205 Affidavits involved in
the robosigning scandal contained mistakes where the lender incorrectly
reported the terms of the note or stated an incorrect amount owed by the
homeowner.206
Like the multistate settlement resolving the robosigning debacle, the
Indiana Best Practices also addresses a dual-track system.207 Under the
Best Practices, if the homeowner requests a settlement conference to be
reviewed for loss-mitigation eligibility, “no dispositive motions should
be granted” until the conclusion of the settlement conference process.208
Thus, the lender may not proceed with a motion for summary judgment,
a motion for default, or a judgment for foreclosure.209 Further, “[i]f, at
foreclosure prevention agreement under this chapter, then its counsel
should attach as an Exhibit to the Complaint a copy of the foreclosure
prevention agreement and a record of payments substantiating default.
Id.
See generally Indiana Foreclosure Laws, REALTYTRAC, http://www.realtytrac.com/realestate-guides/foreclosure-laws/indiana-foreclosure-laws/indiana-foreclosure-laws/ (last
visited Mar. 22, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/QYP6-9DUN (discussing Indiana
foreclosure laws). In Indiana, “[t]he foreclosure process begins [when] the lender files a
complaint in court against the borrower.” Id. “The date the mortgage was executed
controls the pre-foreclosure period between filing the complaint and the foreclosure sale.”
Id. However, “[t]here is no waiting period for abandoned properties.” Id. Therefore, if a
lender wrongly concludes that a home has been abandoned, a homeowner may lose his or
her right to a waiting period. See Calbreath, supra note 164 (describing situations where
lenders wrongly denied loss mitigation options to homeowners and eventually foreclosed
on their homes even after the homeowners made timely payments under their supposed
loan modification plans).
206
Am. Pet. for an Order, supra note 184, at 2 (recognizing frequent mistakes on affidavits
filed in Indiana courts, including failures to list the proper amount of the loan or the correct
interest rate); see supra Part IV.A (noting that affidavits supporting summary judgment and
default judgment were “robosigned” by employees, leading to many critical mistakes in
these documents, which negatively impacted homeowners).
207
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 3 (disallowing dispositive
motions once the defendant properly requests a settlement conference until the plaintiff,
the defendant, or a court-appointed facilitator files a settlement conference report with the
court).
208
Id. Best Practices states:
If [the] Defendant requests a settlement conference under []§ 32-3010.5-9, no dispositive motions should be granted until one of the
following occurs: 1) The court receives notice that the debtor and
creditor have agreed to enter into a foreclosure prevention agreement;
or 2) The court receives notice that the debtor and creditor are unable
to agree on the terms of a foreclosure prevention agreement.
Id.
209
See A. Benjamin Spencer, CIVIL PROCEDURE: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 704, 745
(2d. ed., 2008) (explaining that summary judgment and default judgment are mechanisms
to dispose of claims without a trial). See also Foreclosure, IND. LEGAL SERVICES, (2004),
205
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the settlement conference, the parties commence discussions regarding
loss mitigation alternatives and conclude that additional information or
documentation should be exchanged,” before the homeowner’s
eligibility can be established, the settlement conference will be
reconvened at a later date.210
The Best Practices also clarify that if a homeowner requests a
settlement conference, it will be treated as the homeowner’s appearance
in the case so the homeowner will receive notice of any future court
filings.211 However, these provisions only protect homeowners who
request a settlement conference.212 While this is a welcomed safeguard,
fewer than 42% of Indiana homeowners exercise their right for a
settlement conference, leaving 58% of Indiana homeowners without
these protections.213 If these remaining homeowners do not seek
assistance from the OAG, a housing counselor, or a legal services
attorney, they are likely to lose their homes.214 The Best Practices also
available at http://archive-org.com/page/600935/2012-11-07/http://www.indianajustice.
org/Data/DocumentLibrary/Documents/1099151393.21/view_article_publicweb?topic_id
=1621200&library=PublicWeb, archived at http://perma.cc/EF95-R5J4 (stating what a
lender may not do).
210
See MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 3 (explaining that this
creates cause to “reconvene the settlement conference at a later date, and dispositive
motions should not be granted pursuant to § 32-30-10.5-8.5(b) until the settlement
conference report has been submitted to the Court by the Plaintiff(s), Defendant(s), or a
court-appointed facilitator”).
211
See id. (“If Defendant requests a settlement conference under []§ 32-30-10.5-9, the court
shall treat this request as the entry of an appearance in accordance with T.R. 3.1(B).”).
212
See id. (establishing that these provisions only apply to homeowners who have
actually requested a settlement conference).
213
See Elizabeth Daulton, Robo-Signing and Settlement Conferences Among Issues Addressed
in Recently Published Best Practices Guide (Jan. 31, 2011), http://indiana
courts.us/times/2011/01/mortgage-foreclosure/, archived at http://perma.cc/HFR3-93KZ
(noting that more than 40% of Indiana homeowners facing foreclosure have requested
settlement conferences since the Mortgage Foreclosure Trial Assistance Program was
introduced in the participating counties).
214
See GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. REBUILDING AMERICA: HOW STATES CAN
SAVE MILLIONS OF HOMES THROUGH FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 6 (Feb. 2012), available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-foreclosuremediation.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/GXU2-ZJUA (noting a 2011 study’s finding that
“homeowners who received counseling were 1.7 times more likely to avoid a foreclosure
sale than those who did not.”). The OAG receives hundreds of complaints each year from
homeowners struggling with servicers to find a loss mitigation option to save their home.
Here are some common examples:
(1) Arbitrary Behavior on the Part of the Servicer. The loan servicer
placed the borrower in a three-month trial modification under HAMP
with a permanent modification to follow. The borrower made her first
payment when due.
Two weeks later, however, the servicer
unexpectedly removed the borrower from HAMP, claiming that
securitization-related agreements between the investor and the
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contain sanctions for attorneys or homeowners who do not comply with
the legal requirements or who fail to abide by court directives.215
Specifically, the Best Practices prohibit a lender from asking a

servicer prevented the agreement with the borrower; subsequently, the
borrower was denied her HAMP modification request. Upon advice
from her housing counselor, the borrower contacted the OAG. After
OAG intervention, the servicer agreed to abide by the HAMP trial
modification agreement. Note that the housing counselor was unable
to resolve the crisis without the assistance of OAG attorneys. In
another case, the loan servicer offered to modify the borrowers’ FHA
loan. After the borrowers entered into a written loan modification
agreement with the servicer, however, they were informed that FHA
had not approved the loan modification, and it was denied. After
OAG intervention, the servicer offered the borrowers a four-month
trial modification under FHA-HAMP, to be followed by a permanent
modification. The borrowers made their required four months of
payments, but the servicer failed to send them a permanent
modification until three months later. The borrowers signed and
returned the contract to the servicer, but they were rejected due to an
issue with the agreement’s notarization. The servicer informed the
borrowers that it was going to proceed with foreclosure. Again, after
the OAG intervention, the servicer agreed to send a mobile notary to
the borrowers’ house so that they could re-sign, and the notary could
correctly notarize the modification. The borrowers’ modification has
now been applied to their account and they are current on their
mortgage payments.
(2) Property taxes. One loan servicer paid a borrower’s property
tax installment three times over the course of a month, creating a
deficiency in the borrower’s escrow account of over $1,500. This
caused the borrower’s monthly payment to increase drastically, and he
was unable to persuade the servicer to fix the problem and readjust his
payment. After OAG intervention, the servicer obtained a refund of
the overpayment from the county and reanalyzed the borrower’s
escrow to bring his payment down to the correct amount.
Notes of Abigail Kuzma (unpublished) (on file with author).
215
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 5. The Best Practices
state:
If either party fails to attend the settlement conference or fails
to abide by other court directives, appropriate sanctions may
be considered. Judges in St. Joseph and Allen counties have
levied sanctions ranging from $150 to $2,500 on plaintiffs who
repeatedly failed to attend a settlement conference or who
refused to provide documents as requested by the courtappointed facilitator. A homeowner defendant who fails to
attend the settlement conference may be perceived as waiving
his or her right to a settlement conference, and the foreclosure
should proceed as otherwise allowed by law.
Id.
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homeowner to waive his or her right to a settlement conference.216 This
provision dissuades lenders from asking homeowners to waive their
settlement conference rights to be considered for loss mitigation.217
Further, the Best Practices contain provisions for post-judgment
motions.218 These provisions resolve concerns that an attorney may
attempt to overturn a previous loss-mitigation agreement, such as a short
sale or a previously granted deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, to make the
homeowner liable for forgiven indebtedness. The Best Practices requires
post-judgment motions to set aside a mortgage foreclosure judgment to
state the reason for the request so the judge may be aware of the
potential danger and may examine the motion.219 In addition, following
the robosigning debacle, banks now review the veracity of previously
filed affidavits and file a supplemental or substitute affidavit when a
mistake is found.220 The Best Practices requires that any motion to
overturn a short sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure “be noticed to all
parties, including previously defaulted parties, and set for hearing.”221

216
Id. “Defendant should not be asked by Plaintiff to waive his or her right to a
settlement conference. Such action on the Plaintiff’s behalf may be considered a
sanctionable offense.” Id.
217
See Evan Bedard, Indiana AG Fights to Protect Borrowers’ Rights During Foreclosure,
LOAN SAFE (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.loansafe.org/indiana-ag-fights-to-protectborrowers-rights-during-foreclosure, archived at http://perma.cc/64B3-9PTL (noting that
the Indiana Supreme Court’s task force made recommendations based on a concern that
some borrowers were not given the full opportunity to pursue loss mitigation options).
218
See MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 5. The Best Practices
states:
Any motion to set aside a mortgage foreclosure judgment
should state the reason for the request.
The
borrowers/homeowner should be sent notice of the request.
A petition to set aside a judgment that attempts to reinstate
the loan should be allowed because of reinstatement or
modification of the loan or other foreclosure prevention or
loss mitigation agreement.
Id.
219
See id. (explaining that a motion to set aside a mortgage foreclosure judgment must
include a reason for the request).
220
See Robo-Signing Continues; Foreclosures Could Be Affected, PELLEY LAW OFFICE, LLP
(Sept. 28, 2011), http://knowledgebase.findlaw.com/kb/2011/Sep/380253.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/S5KH-WUAV (discussing robosigning settlements that require
financial institutions to investigate their internal procedures and stop filing incorrect
affidavits); see also supra Part IV (describing the nationwide investigation and settlement of
the robosigning allegations and the various requirements ensuring protection for
homeowners facing foreclosure).
221
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BEST PRACTICES, supra note 188, at 5 (“A party seeking to file
a supplemental affidavit or substitute a previously filed affidavit must file a motion stating
the grounds for the substitution.”).
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Finally, before the robosigning settlement, the Indiana Division of
State Court Administration developed a secure online portal system (“eportal”) to enable servicers and their local counsel to “effectively
communicate with borrowers and their representatives regarding their
mutual loss[-]mitigation efforts.”222 The goal is to “facilitate the
exchange of necessary documents . . . [and] provid[e] a direct
communication channel between all of the stakeholders[.]”223 The
intended result is that “mediation sessions will become more productive
and lead to more resolutions in less time.”224 The e-portal provides
confirmation to both the homeowner and the servicer that a particular
document was sent and has been received by the other party.225
Therefore, the e-portal should reduce the communication disputes and
errors that commonly plague the loss-mitigation process.
C. Indiana Settlement Conference Legislation and Other Midwest Mediation
Programs
As noted above in Part IV.B, the Indiana Best Practices have assisted
in preventing unneeded foreclosures and six of the Best Practices were

222
See Secure Network Set-Up to Help Housing Lenders and Borrowers Exchange
Information, supra note 174 (discussing communication problems between major parties
involved in foreclosure actions and suggesting that the implementation of the Mediation
Portal Project will reduce these communication errors). The portal may be accessed at
www.dclmwp.com. The basic procedures for the portal are as follows: the Default
Counsel electronically files a record of any new foreclosure and uploads the necessary
documents from the Borrower. Id. A notification of the new foreclosure is then forwarded
to a court-designated facilitator through the Portal, and the facilitator contacts the
Borrower to determine if the Borrower wants to request a settlement conference. Id. If the
Borrower requests a settlement conference, the facilitator refers the Borrower to a
designated housing counselor, and the court issues an order requiring the conference. Id.
Next, the Default Counsel notifies the designated housing counselor through the Portal and
gives the counselor access to the Borrower’s documents using a unique invitation code. Id.
The housing counselor works with the Borrower to upload any additional necessary
documents to the Portal before the settlement conference. Id. Finally, after all of the
Borrower’s documents have been uploaded, the Portal will automatically notify the Default
Counsel that the Borrower’s package is complete. Secure Network Set-Up to Help Housing
Lenders and Borrowers Exchange Information, supra note 174. The Default Counsel will
then review the package to ensure it is complete, and the settlement conference will
proceed. Id.; see also Welcome to The DMM Loss Mitigation Web Portal, DEFAULT MITIGATION
MGMT., LLC (2014), https://www.dclmwp.com/Home, archived at http://perma.cc/
C8KW-LA5V (providing the web portal).
223
Secure Network Set-Up to Help Housing Lenders and Borrowers Exchange
Information, supra note 174.
224
Id.
225
See id. (describing the basic procedures of the Portal and the process of uploading
documents).
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codified into Indiana’s settlement conference law.226 According to the
National Consumer Law Center, settlement conference and mediation
programs have proven effective in saving homes from foreclosure.227 “If
these programs are strengthened and expanded, they can prevent
millions of foreclosures that will otherwise take place over the next
several years.”228
In 2009, the Indiana legislature passed Senate Enrolled Act 492
(“SEA 492”), which became effective July 1, 2009 and strengthened
Indiana’s unfair-and-deceptive-practices laws and created a foreclosure
settlement conference procedure.229 SEA 492 amended the Indiana
Home Loan Practices Act to prohibit a person from making
misrepresentations that the person “reasonably should know” are
Actual knowledge of misrepresentation,
misrepresentations.230
especially in complex mortgage transactions, is notoriously difficult to
prove; thus, expanded liability for constructive knowledge of
misrepresentation or fraud will ease enforcement of consumer protection
laws and ideally cut down on predatory practices.
The stated purpose of the foreclosure settlement conference law “is
to avoid unnecessary foreclosures [and to] facilitate the modification of
residential mortgages in appropriate circumstances.”231 The law aims to
achieve its purpose through increased notice and information
requirements, a stay on foreclosure judgments, and a settlement
conference provision that enables the homeowner to meet face-to-face
with a lender’s representative who has authority to negotiate a lossmitigation workout on the lender’s behalf.232
This law created two notice requirements.233 First, any creditor
seeking to foreclose a debtor’s primary residence must send notice to the
debtor at least thirty days before filing the foreclosure action.234 The
In re Mortg. Foreclosure Best Practices, No. 94 S 00-1101-MS-3, slip op. at 2 (Ind. Oct.
7, 2011), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/files/order-other-2011-94s00-1101-ms3a.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8QL5-6ZT3.
227
See generally GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L. CONSUMER L. CTR., STATE AND LOCAL
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS:
CAN THEY SAVE HOMES? 30 (2009),
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-statemediation-programs.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F7CG-2ABG (analyzing whether
mitigation programs are capable of preventing homes from being foreclosed).
228
WALSH, supra note 214, at 4.
229
The Indiana legislature passed SEA 582 in 2011, which further strengthened these
laws. See generally IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5 (West Supp. 2013) (providing the foreclosure
prevention agreements for residential mortgages).
230
Id. § 24-9-3-7 (emphasis added).
231
Id. § 32-30-10.5-1(b).
232
Id. §§ 32-30-10.5-8, 8.5(b), 10(d).
233
Id. § 32-30-10.5-8.
234
Id. § 32-30-10.5-8(a).
226
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notice must inform the debtor that he or she is in default and encourage
him or her to seek mortgage foreclosure counseling.235 Second, the
lender must include a notice with the complaint, which must be served
on the homeowner.236 This notice informs the homeowner of his or her
right to a settlement conference.237 The onus is on the debtor to exercise
that right and notify the court, within thirty days of being served, of his
or her intent to participate.238 The court then schedules the settlement
conference to take place within twenty-five to sixty days of the notice
and encourages the debtor to seek mortgage foreclosure counseling
before that date.239 Foreclosure judgments are stayed until both parties
determine they are unable to reach a settlement agreement or the debtor
fails to schedule a settlement conference.240
In 2011, the Indiana General Assembly amended this settlement
conference procedure to codify many of the provisions noted above in
the OAG Best Practices Petition to the Indiana Supreme Court.241
Despite the two-notice requirement already in existence and despite
public awareness and homeowner efforts by the Indiana Foreclosure
Prevention Network (“IFPN”), OAG, and the Indiana Supreme Court,
few homeowners exercised their right to a settlement conference.242
Therefore, SEA 582, passed in 2011, added an additional notice
requirement whereby the court will contact all homeowners after a
foreclosure has been filed.243 In addition, the lender must provide the
court with the most recent contact information available for the
homeowner to facilitate this contact by the court.244 Further, while the
original settlement conference provisions outlined the documentation
“needed to engage in good faith negotiations,” with the court
facilitator—who makes contact with the homeowner under these recent

IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-8(a)(1). The notice must also contain contact information for
the IFPN. Id. § 32-30-10.5-8(a)(2).
236
Id. § 32-30-10.5-8(c).
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id. § 32-30-10.5-10(a)(1)(B); IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-10(a)(1)–(2). This scheduling
window is within forty to sixty days of the notice for all foreclosure actions filed after June
30, 2011.
240
Id. § 32-30-10.5-9(a)(2)(A)–(B).
241
See supra Part IV.C (discussing various provisions of the Petition and explaining the
servicer abuses the provisions seek to correct).
242
Elizabeth Daulton, Michael Gotsch & Nancy Boyer, Settling for Foreclosure? The
Mortgage Foreclosure Settlement Conference (2010), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/
center/files/jedu-lib-foreclosure-mortgage-foreclosure.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
453W-RB6N.
243
IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-8(d)(2) (West Supp. 2013).
244
Id. § 32-30-10.5-8(d)(2)(B).
235
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amendments—will also assist in gathering this required documentation
and, where possible, the Portal is then used to eliminate confusion.245
Similarly, there is confusion about the requirement that foreclosure
judgments are stayed until both parties determine they are unable to
reach a settlement.246 Therefore, the new amendments codify the Best
Practices Petition provision providing that dispositive motions are
stayed until the court receives notice regarding the outcome of
negotiations at the conclusion of the settlement conference.247 Thus, the
dual-track issue is resolved for those who seek a settlement conference.
Further, SEA 582 codified the Best Practices provision that deems the
homeowner’s request for a settlement conference as an appearance.248
This Act also codified the Best Practices provision that allows the judge
to award civil penalties or sanctions when he or she deems it
These funds will benefit programs that promote
appropriate.249
foreclosure prevention.250
Finally, SEA 582 introduces an entirely new concept into the
settlement conference arena. During the foreclosure proceeding, the
court may issue a provisional order to collect payments from
homeowners, based on the homeowner’s ability to pay.251 Homeowners
will pay these funds to the clerk of the court or into an attorney trust
account.252 As soon as a homeowner goes into default, the lender will
often refuse further monthly payments unless the homeowner can bring
the loan current.253 In some instances, this may mean that the
homeowner is not making a regular monthly housing payment for
months. This provision allows the homeowner to continue making
affordable monthly payments while the homeowner’s loss-mitigation
eligibility is being processed; however, SEA 582 also clarifies that the
245
Id. § 32-30-10.5-10(a)(3)(B)(i); see Secure Network Set-Up to Help Housing Lenders and
Borrowers Exchange Information, supra note 174 (discussing the online portals and the
importance of communication); see also The Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force and Settlement
Conference Statistics, supra note 198 (providing statistics of the settlement conference
statistics from the Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force).
246
IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-9(a)(2)(B).
247
Id. § 32-30-10.5-8.5(b)(2).
248
Id. § 32-30-10.5-8.5(c).
249
Id. § 32-30-10.5-10(b)(2).
250
Id. § 5-20-1-27(b).
251
Id. § 32-30-10.5-8.6(b)(1).
252
IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-8.6(c) (West Supp. 2013).
253
See Frequently Asked Questions About Foreclosures, COLO. LEGAL SERVICES (May 2012),
http://www.coloradolegalservices.org/lawhelp/resource/frequently-asked-questionsabout-foreclosures?ref=qVArX, archived at http://perma.cc/5PKT-NJUW (concluding that
this does not mean the homeowner is living in the house for free as monthly payments,
interest, and penalties continue to accrue and are charged to the homeowner under the
terms of the homeowner’s loan documents).
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lender may not charge the homeowner for costs associated with the
settlement conference process.254
Other Midwest states also have settlement conferences or mediation
procedures.255 In Illinois, both Cook County (including Chicago) and
Will County (including Joliet) have a mediation program.256 Further, the
Illinois Homeowner’s Rights Act requires lenders to provide
homeowners notice of their legal rights and options and provide
borrowers with an accurate statement of the outstanding mortgage
balance within ten business days of the borrower’s request.257 This
provision’s goal is to ensure that homeowners know “exactly how much
they must pay to avoid foreclosure, . . . [thereby permitting]
homeowners to quickly explore their options, such as refinancing [their]
loan or selling their home to protect their equity.”258
Iowa does not have a legislated mediation provision, but Iowa
Mediation Service, a nonprofit organization, works with Iowa
homeowners and lenders on foreclosure prevention and refinancing in
five cities throughout the state.259 This is a joint program with the Iowa

254
IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-10(b)(1). The Act also provides that “a person who is not the
owner of real property . . . and who suspects that the [land or] property may be vacant or
abandoned, may enter upon the premise[]” to secure it, remove trash from it, or maintain
it, as long as the person does not enter any structure on the property. Id. § 34-30-26-5(a).
255
See generally HEATHER SCHEIWE KULP, RESOLUTION SYSTEMS INSTITUTE, FORECLOSURE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM MODELS STATE-BY-STATE, http://www.aboutrsi.org/
pfimages/ForeclosureMediationProgramModels_September2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 12,
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/K7GE-4XLU (outlining alternative dispute resolution
programs in various states).
256
See Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program, CIR. CT. OF COOK CNTY. (2010),
http://cookcountyforeclosurehelp.org/, archived at http://perma.cc/6NT2-PCL7 (stating
the goals of the Cook County mediation program). See generally PAMELA J. MCGUIRE,
CLERK CIR. CT. WILL CNTY. NOTICE OF MANDATORY MEDIATION (2010), available at
http://www.willcountycircuitcourt.com/forms/mediation/116.pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/K678-CS3S (explaining the Will County mediation program). The Cook
County mediation program reports that “38% of homeowners going through the
[mediation program] have been able to save their homes” and an additional “12% have
reached . . . a dignified exit.” STATE OF ILLINOIS, CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY,
CHANCERY DIVISION MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT
(June 27, 2012), available at http://www.cookcountycourt.org/Portals/0/Chancery%20
Division/Forclosure%20Mediation/Foreclosure%20Mediation%20Progress%20Report%20J
une%202012%20(with%20Appendixes).pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/8PAL-42T4.
257
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/15-1504.5, 1505.5 (West 2009).
258
Homeowner’s Rights, ILL. ATT’Y GEN. (2010), http://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/
consumers/homeowners_rights.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PT4Y-CDSL.
259
See generally Information on Iowa Mediation Service’s Mortgage Mediation Program, IOWA
MED. SERV. (2008), http://iowamediationservice.com, archived at http://perma.cc/43BSXN5P (providing an overview of the services provided by Iowa Mediation Services).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss1/9

Lawlis Kuzma: Foreclosure in the Heartland: What Did We Learn?

2014]

Foreclosure in the Heartland

81

Attorney General and is a voluntary program whereby borrowers and
lenders meet with a neutral third party mediator to seek a resolution.260
In 2008, Michigan enacted the Michigan Home Foreclosure
Prevention Act, which permitted the commissioner to evaluate
information about the lender and borrower and decide whether
foreclosure action was necessary.261 Where suitable, the commissioner
had the option to “extend the filing date for a foreclosure for up to
[ninety days or] require the lender and the borrower to participate in
mediation.”262 Effective December 22, 2011, House Bill 4543 required
that a list of approved counselors accompany the complaint.263 A debtor
had thirty days to contact one of these approved counselors and set up a
negotiation with his or her lender.264 However, in December 2012, the
Michigan legislature repealed these provisions.265
Wisconsin has eleven counties with foreclosure mediation
programs.266 In each of these programs, mediation is voluntary; both the
homeowner and the lender must agree to mediate.267 For example, Dane
County Circuit Court requires lenders to tell homeowners that they have
an option to mediate their foreclosure cases and notify them of available
resources, including a University of Wisconsin law student clinic.268
There are also a number of websites available to assist Wisconsin
homeowners.269 Indiana’s settlement conference legislation is not the
Id.
AM. BAR ASS’N, RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION RESOURCES FOR ADR
PROFESSIONALS (Feb. 9, 2009), available at www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
migrated/DR_Foreclosure_Resource_Page.authcheckdam.doc,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/4H24-PG2F.
262
Id.
263
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3205a(2) (West Supp. 2013).
264
Id. § 600.3205b(1).
265
2012 MICH. PUB. ACTS 521 (effective June 30, 2013).
266
Two More Counties Launch Foreclosure Mediation Programs, 18 THE THIRD BRANCH 3
(Summer 2010), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/news/thirdbranch/docs/
summer10.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/38Z5-DY8K. Under the Milwaukee program
nearly 50% of mediated cases are resolved with a modification of the loan. Attorney General
J.B. Van Hollen and The Metro Milwaukee Foreclosure Mediation Program Announce New,
Improved Process for Homeowners Seeking Mediation Services, WIS. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE (Feb. 26,
2013), http://www.doj.state.wi.us/media-center/2013-news-releases/february-26-2013-0,
archived at http://perma.cc/LDL3-M7DF [hereinafter Milwaukee Foreclosure Mediation
Program].
267
See generally Milwaukee Foreclosure Mediation Program, supra note 266 (discussing how
foreclosure problems are solved through mediation).
268
Karen Rivedal, UW Law Students to Give “Lifeline” through Foreclosure Mediation
Program, WIS. ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www.law.wisc.edu/news/Articles/
UW_law_students_give_lifeline_th_2010-01-28, archived at http://perma.cc/G9KX-72RN.
269
See generally HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUND., http://www.995hope.org (last
visited June 10, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/3XZQ-FU8Y (providing an example of a
website aimed to assist Wisconsin homeowners); TAKE ROOT MILWAUKEE,
260
261
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state’s only response to the foreclosure crisis; it has also established a
foreclosure prevention network.
D. Indiana Foreclosure Prevention Network and Other Midwest Foreclosure
Hotlines
As soon as the foreclosure crisis hit and thousands of families faced
foreclosure, homeowner advocates recognized that homeowners were
ill-prepared to represent themselves in the loss-mitigation process. In
response, Indiana and other states established foreclosure hotlines for
homeowners to call a toll-free number for a referral to a housing
counselor in their area, who would advise homeowners on what lossmitigation relief might be available to them and assist in their
negotiations with their lender.270 In Indiana, the foreclosure prevention
hotline is administered by the IFPN.271
In early 2006, the Indiana Housing and Community Development
Authority (“IHCDA”) met with various government agencies and
industry leaders to discuss the foreclosure crisis and propose potential
foreclosure-reducing solutions.272 The IHCDA developed the IFPN,
which “worked with [state] elected officials to enable legislation for a
[multi-tiered] solution to delinquency and foreclosure.”273 In November
2007, the IFPN initiative was implemented, which “included a [targeted]
public awareness campaign, a telephone helpline, and a statewide
network of trained mortgage foreclosure counselors.”274
The public awareness campaign encouraged homeowners facing
foreclosure to seek help by visiting the program’s website at
www.877gethope.org or calling the telephone helpline at 1-877-GEThttp://takerootmilwaukee.com/about-take-root-milwaukee.html (last visited Mar. 26,
2012), archived at http://perma.cc/6WC8-RBZL (listing another example of a website that is
focused on helping homeowners); WIS. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION NETWORK,
http://www.mediatemilwaukee.com/Home_Page.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2012),
archived at http://perma.cc/6J9Y-S543 (demonstrating that there are a variety of websites
that are available to provide help to homeowners); WIS. HOUS. & ECON. DEV. AUTH.,
available at http://www.wisconsinforeclosureresource.com (last visited June 10, 2012),
archived at http://perma.cc/LCH3-XL8T (providing another example of a website aimed at
benefiting homeowners).
270
See About, IND. FORECLOSURE PREVENTION NETWORK, http://877gethope.org/about/
(last visited Mar. 26, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/K3BK-63SR (discussing Indiana’s
foreclosure hotline, which connects homeowners with a certified foreclosure prevention
specialist).
271
Id. The Indiana Housing and Community Authority created the IFPN to help reduce
the amount of foreclosures after it conducted a series of meetings with government
agencies regarding the foreclosure crisis. Id.
272
Id.
273
Id.
274
Id.
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HOPE.275 When homeowners call the helpline, they are referred to a
“foreclosure prevention specialist” from a nonprofit organization to
guide them through the foreclosure process and assist them with lossmitigation options.276 This “Don’t Let the Walls Foreclose in on You”
public awareness campaign distributed over 350,000 marketing pieces.277
The campaign also included radio, print, and billboard communications
that targeted communities with the highest foreclosure concentrations.278
Additionally, the IFPN hosted multiple events specifically designed to
facilitate contact between borrowers, lenders, and housing counselors.279
There were over 900 borrowers who met with their lenders or housing
counselors during these events.280 The IFPN also partnered with other
agencies to host a “Phone-A-Thon,” which provided homeowners the
opportunity to seek foreclosure prevention advice from various agencies
by simply placing a call.281 According to the Indiana Housing &
Community Development Authority, over sixty thousand Hoosiers have
received assistance from the IFPN, 3000 of which came from the “PhoneA-Thon.”282
The OAG and the Indiana Supreme Court also partnered together in
additional foreclosure efforts, and have recruited and trained over a
thousand pro bono attorneys to represent homeowners at settlement
conferences.283 In addition, between 2009 and 2011, the OAG presented
at forty-six foreclosure prevention seminars, including twenty-three
Continuing Legal Education (“CLE”) programs training pro bono
attorneys and judges.284 Through these seminars and CLE programs, the
OAG educated more than 2000 attorneys and judges.285 Including
community fairs and other events, the OAG reached nearly 12,700

About, supra note 270.
Id.
277
IND. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. AUTH., Indiana Foreclosure Prevention Network: Marketing and
Resource Development Services Request for Proposals 3 (2010), available at http://www.in.gov/
ihcda/files/RFP_-IFPN_Marketing_and_Resource_Development_(2).pdf,
archived
at
http://perma.cc/4VPM-VSB5.
278
Id.
279
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
Id.
283
1000 Trained to Handle Foreclosure Cases: Indiana Supreme Court Offers New
Pledge of Support, supra note 139.
284
Memorandum from Michelle Mayer, Outreach Section Chief, St. of Ind. Office of Att’y
Gen., to Abigail Kuzma, Chief Counsel & Dir. of Consumer Prot., St. of Ind. Office of Att’y
Gen., Outreach Totals for Mortgage Foreclosure Prevention Events (Feb. 1, 2012) (copy on
file with Valparaiso University Law Review).
285
Id.
275
276

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 1 [2015], Art. 9

84

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

Hoosiers.286 Furthermore, the OAG distributed more than 9000 handouts
and other educational materials on mortgage fraud and foreclosure
prevention to Hoosiers across Indiana.287 Recently, the IFPN received
funding through the “Hardest Hit Fund” to assist unemployed
homeowners in keeping their homes when their primary residence is
subject to foreclosure.288
Other Midwest states also developed a foreclosure hotline to assist
homeowners facing foreclosure. For example, Iowa Mortgage Help is
sponsored by the Iowa Home Ownership Education Project, the Iowa
Office of the Attorney General, Iowa Finance Authority, and the Iowa
Mediation Service, Inc. (“IMS”).289 Homeowners seeking foreclosure
prevention information may call a toll-free number, which will connect
them with trained housing counselors prepared to assist them through
the foreclosure process.290 Group counseling classes are also available in
Des Moines and Cedar Rapids.291
The Michigan State Housing Development Authority (“MSHDA”)
operates a toll-free hotline that directs homeowners to a foreclosure
prevention specialist in their county.292 This program also includes
information on the website to assist homeowners who are experiencing
financial difficulties or facing foreclosure, including information
concerning Michigan’s statewide network of homeownership counselors,
a second mortgage program to assist current MSHDA borrowers, and
refinance programs for eligible homeowners.293

Id.
Id.
288
See generally Indiana’s Hardest Hit Fund, IND. H. REPUBLICANS, http://www.in.gov/
legislative/house_republicans/2298.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2014), archived at
http://perma.cc/X6YQ-CV4W (discussing how the “Hardest Hit Fund” gives financial
assistance to individuals who have been most negatively affected by the recent poor
economy).
289
IOWA FIN. AUTH., available at http://www.iowamortgagehelp.com/ (last visited Nov.
8, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/FA63-Q5E5; Press Release, Iowa Dep’t of Justice, Off.
of the Att’y Gen., “Iowa Mortgage Help” Will Aid Home Owners Struggling with
Mortgage Payments (Feb. 28, 2008), http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/
releases/feb_2008/Iowa_Mortgage_help.html, archived at http://perma.cc/C8HW-3MPV.
290
Help for Homeowners, IOWA FIN. AUTH. (2014), http://www.iowamortgage
help.com/homeowners/, archived at http://perma.cc/RWD7-8VMW; Supporting Home
Ownership Education in Iowa: Iowa Mortgage Help, IOWA HOME OWNERSHIP EDUC. PROJECT
(2008), http://www.ihoep.com/newsdetails.php?newsId=2, archived at http://perma.cc/
J3WU-CH96.
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visited Nov. 19, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/6JS8-MCGB.
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The “Save the Dream Ohio” hotline provides Ohioans facing
foreclosure with legal assistance and contacts for HUD-certified housing
agencies.294 Hotline operators also connect callers with the Ohio Benefit
Bank, which helps the callers determine their eligibility for additional
support in alleviating their financial burdens.295 In 2007, the Ohio
Housing Financing Agency (“OHFA”) and the Ohio Department of
Development’s Office of Housing and Community Partnerships
established the Ohio Home Rescue Fund Program.296 The Ohio Home
Rescue Fund Program aids homeowners by providing financial
assistance to those who are “struggling to make their mortgage
payments due to unforeseen, temporary life circumstances.”297 Between
the 2006 and 2008 fiscal years, the program aided 762 households
comprising roughly 2056 people.298
The Wisconsin Housing and Economic Development Authority
provides a toll-free hotline, Homeowner’s HOPE, which is answered
twenty-four hours a day by trained housing (credit) counselors who
assist homeowners to “establish a budget, understand the terms of [their]
loans, and talk with [their] financial institution.”299 Homeowner’s HOPE
is also represented by its own website, which provides information and
resources.300 In Illinois, programs have been developed for specific
counties with high concentrations of foreclosure instead of statewide
programs. For example, in Cook County, homeowners who have
received a foreclosure summons may call a toll-free help line to schedule
a free meeting with a housing counselor.301
V. CONCLUSION
The Midwest’s high unemployment and preexisting economic slump
has exacerbated the foreclosure crisis.
Both federal and state
governments have responded with extensive foreclosure-prevention
efforts. While no single effort has been a panacea and each effort has
294
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295
Id.
296
Id.
297
Save the Dream Ohio:
History, SAVE THE DREAM OHIO, available at
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needed extensive amendments to improve its effectiveness, Indiana has
developed an effective combination of programs. These programs,
combined with the OAG Robosigning Multistate Servicing Standards,
the federal laws implemented in HAMP and HAFA, and the Dodd-Frank
Act, have helped homeowners facing foreclosure. However, the federal
government still has not reformed the rating system, which also
contributed to the foreclosure crisis and recession. Moreover, while
Dodd-Frank tightened some of the underwriting practices that led to
some homeowners purchasing homes without the ability to pay, there is
a difficult tension between strict underwriting standards on the one
hand, and ensuring that lower income families and first time
homeowners have the opportunity for home ownership, on the other.
Recently, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have come under criticism that
they may be beginning to move toward some of the lending practices
that contributed to large losses during the mortgage crisis.302
Like other Midwest states, Indiana introduced a toll-free foreclosure
prevention hotline that refers homeowners to trained housing
counselors. Nevertheless, Indiana is only now seeing significant
improvement in the number of homeowners saving their homes through
loss-mitigation efforts. This is because of a critical combination of
efforts, including the OAG Multistate and Best Practices Petition that
responded to robosigning and other servicer abuses; legislation to
provide homeowners with a right to a settlement conference where they
meet face-to-face with their lender to determine their eligibility for a
workout to save their home; and finally, the MFTCAP project, where
Indiana courts take an active role in contacting the homeowner and
facilitating the settlement conference process.

See Joe Light, Fannie and Freddie See Potential for Thaw in Mortgage Access (Nov. 6, 2014),
available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/fannie-mae-profit-falls-55-1415277851, archived
at http://perma.cc/WD3V-FWMB (indicating that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may have
contributed to the losses incurred during the mortgage crisis).
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